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Abstract 
 
Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) is a platform for Nordic cooperation and 
competence in nuclear safety and related radiation protection issues including 
emergency preparedness and protection of the environment. Its purpose is to 
carry out joint activities producing seminars, exercises, scientific articles, 
technical reports and other types of reference material, with special efforts made 
to engage young scientists.  
The region in question is the five Nordic countries, i.e., Denmark (including the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, who share 
a common cultural and historic heritage. The Nordic countries have cooperated in 
the field of nuclear safety for approximately half a century, developing informal 
networks for exchange of information, strengthening the region’s potential for 
fast, coordinated and adequate response to nuclear threats, incidents and 
accidents. Activities are financed and supported by Nordic authorities, research 
institutions, power companies, contractors and other organizations, with results 
used by participating organizations in their decision making processes and 
information efforts.The NKS-R and NKS-B Joint Summary Seminar held at the 
Armémuseum, Stockholm on the 26th - 27th of March 2009 showcased a range 
of activities supported by NKS over the previous 2 years and provided an 
opportunity to bring together researchers and end users from the wider NKS 
community. This summary seminar was the first joint venture between the NKS-R 
and NKS-B Programmes since the current two programme format was adopted 
by NKS. One of our intentions in organising the Joint Summary Seminar was to 
further the reciprocal awareness of ongoing research and issues under the 
respective NKS-R and NKS-B Programmes, with the aim of promoting new 
networking opportunities and generating new ideas and approaches to solving 
existing problems. 
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Foreword 
Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) is a platform for Nordic cooperation and competence in nuclear safety 
and related radiation protection issues including emergency preparedness and protection of the environment. 
Its purpose is to carry out joint activities producing seminars, exercises, scientific articles, technical reports 
and other types of reference material, with special efforts made to engage young scientists.  
The region in question is the five Nordic countries, i.e., Denmark (including the Faroe Islands and Greenland), 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, who share a common cultural and historic heritage. The Nordic 
countries have cooperated in the field of nuclear safety for approximately half a century, developing informal 
networks for exchange of information, strengthening the region’s potential for fast, coordinated and adequate 
response to nuclear threats, incidents and accidents. Activities are financed and supported by Nordic 
authorities, research institutions, power companies, contractors and other organizations, with results used by 
participating organizations in their decision making processes and information efforts. 
 
The owners and main financiers of NKS are:  
• Danish Emergency Management Agency  
• Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy  
• Icelandic Radiation Safety Authority  
• Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority  
• Swedish Radiation Safety Authority  
 
Additional financial support is obtained from the following organizations:  
• Fennovoima Oy in Finland  
• Fortum Power and Heat Oy in Finland  
• TVO in Finland  
• IFE in Norway  
• Forsmarks Kraftgrupp AB in Sweden  
• Nuclear Training and Safety Center AB (KSU) in Sweden  
• OKG AB in Sweden  
• Ringhals AB in Sweden  
 
The NKS-R and NKS-B Joint Summary Seminar held at the Armémuseum, Stockholm on the 26th - 27th of 
March 2009 showcased a range of activities supported by NKS over the previous 2 years and provided an 
opportunity to bring together researchers and end users from the wider NKS community. This summary 
seminar was the first joint venture between the NKS-R and NKS-B Programmes since the current two 
programme format was adopted by NKS. One of our intentions in organising the Joint Summary Seminar was 
to further the reciprocal awareness of ongoing research and issues under the respective NKS-R and NKS-B 
Programmes, with the aim of promoting new networking opportunities and generating new ideas and 
approaches to solving existing problems. As the NKS-R and NKS-B Programme Managers we would like to 
express our thanks to all the participants of the Joint Summary Seminar and in particular to those who 
presented NKS activities. In addition, we extend our thanks once again to all the organisations that contribute 
financial support to NKS, without which, such seminars would not be possible. 
 
Patrick Isaksson 
NKS-R Programme Manager 
Justin Gwynn 
NKS-B Programme Manager 
 i
Table of Contents 
 Page 
NKS-R AutoNewTech: Levels of automation and user control - evaluation of a turbine 
automation interface 
Jonas Andersson (Chalmers University of Technology) 
1 
NKS-R MOSACA: Safety culture - dimensions and evaluation 
Teemu Reiman (VTT) 
3 
NKS-B BIODOS: Biodosimetry application in emergency preparedness; NKS-B 
BIOPEX: Emergency preparedness exercise for biological dosimetry 
Carita Lindholm (STUK) 
7 
NKS-R StratRev: Stratification issues in the primary system. Review of available 
validation experiments and State-of-the-Art in modelling capabilities 
Johan Westin (Vattenfall Research and Development) 
10 
NKS-R POOL: Experiments and modelling of pressure suppression pools 
Timo Pättikangas (VTT) 
13 
NKS-B REIN: Slower decline in Chernobyl 137Cs contamination in reindeer 
Lavrans Skuterud (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority) 
17 
NKS-B GAPRAD: Filling knowledge gaps in radiation protection methodologies for 
non-human biota 
Justin Brown (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority) 
21 
NKS-R NROI: Radiolytic oxidation of iodine in containment conditions 
Joachim Holm (Chalmers University of Technology) 
24 
NKS-R ExCoolSE: The study of multiscale multiphase phenomena in Nordic BWR - 
severe accidents 
Pavel Kudinov (Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)) 
27 
NKS-B SPECIATION: Speciation analysis of radionuclides in the environment 
Xiaolin Hou (Risø DTU National Laboratory) 
31 
NKS-B HOT II: Radioactive particles in a Nordic context 
Brit Salbu (Norwegian University of Life Sciences) 
35 
NKS-R WERISK: Climate extremes in changing climate 
Grigory Nikulin (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute) 
38 
NKS-R PODRIS: Importance of inspection reliability assumptions on piping failure 
probability estimates 
Kaisa Simola (VTT) 
41 
NKS-B NORDRISK: Nuclear risk from atmospheric dispersion in Northern Europe 
Bent Lauritzen (Risø DTU National Laboratory) 
44 
NKS-B PardNor: Improved ingestion dose modelling for Nordic decision support 
Kasper Andersson (Risø DTU National Laboratory) 
47 
 ii
NKS-R WASCO: Wire system ageing assessment and condition monitoring 
Paolo Fantoni (IFE OECD Halden Reactor Project) 
51 
NKS-R IACIP: Comparison of VNEM to Measured Data from Ringhals Unit 3 
Makoto Tsuiki (IFE OECD Halden Reactor Project) 
55 
NKS-B GammaRate: Safe use of Portable gamma radiation ratemeters for 
environmental monitoring 
Linda Persson (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) 
58 
NKS-B REMSPEC: Analysis of remotely accrued complex gamma ray spectra. A 
proficiency test 
Mark Dowdall (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority) 
59 
NKS-R SafetyGoal: Probabilistic safety goals for nuclear power plants 
Michael Knochenhauer (Relcon Scandpower) 
63 
NKS-R RiskEval: Interpretation and risk evaluation of technical specification 
conditions 
Ola Bäckström (Relcon Scandpower) 
66 
NKS- B URBHAND: Handbook for Nordic decision support for contaminated 
inhabited areas 
Kasper Andersson (Risø DTU National Laboratory) 
70 
NKS-B LUCIA: Assessing the impact of releases of radionuclides into sewage systems 
in urban environment - simulation, modelling and experimental studies 
Synnöve Sundell-Bergman (Vattenfall Power Consultant) 
73 
 1
NKS-R AutoNewTech: Levels of automation and user control - evaluation of a 
turbine automation interface 
Jonas Andersson 
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden 
jonas.andersson@chalmers.se
 
Automation technology has changed human activity in process control from manual work on the plant floor to 
distant supervisory control in control room environments. In the case of turbine operation in nuclear power 
plants, automation plays an important role. Automation offers many advantages in terms of stable control and 
efficiency and it also facilitates control room work by relieving the operator of continuous manual actions. 
However, automation has also shown to create a number of problems such as “out of the loop” performance 
problems, degradation of skills, automation surprises, brittleness and inappropriate trust. These effects all 
reduce operators’ ability to stay on top of their working situation and are directly connected to the design and 
level of automation applied in the technical system.  
The purpose of this study was to examine how operator performance is affected by different levels of 
automation in nuclear power plant turbine operation. The aims were to investigate how the automatic turbine 
system (ATS) design support the turbine operators in their work in terms of monitoring and controlling the 
turbine process, and to identify possible improvements in the ATS user interface design.  
The automatic turbine system consists of a series of sequences that can take the turbine equipment from an 
axis stand still to full operation, where the generator produces electricity to the grid. The automatic system can 
also be used in the reverse order to bring the turbine to a standstill. It is mainly used during turbine start-up 
and shut-down. This process takes place through seven main steps that contain approximately ten sub-steps 
each. The system can be utilized using three different levels of automation; manual, step-mode and fully 
automatic. Manual operation corresponds to separate control of each object in the sequences, whereas in step-
mode the automation is used to perform sequences but the operator has to acknowledge each step. In full 
automation the operator only monitor the ATS user interface.  
In the empirical field study, seven experienced nuclear power plant turbine operators were interviewed 
approximately one hour each to get their opinion of the ATS interface and what automation related problems 
they had experienced. The participating operators worked at the Oskarshamn 3 nuclear power plant. The 
interviews were performed during the annual operator training at the Studsvik nuclear power plant full-scope 
simulator facility in Sweden, where the operator teams performed training scenarios that included handling of 
the ATS. The interviews were recorded and transcribed to allow a correct analysis and avoid distortion of 
collected data. In addition to the interviews, a heuristic evaluation was performed to analyse the interface 
systematically. This assessment allowed a systematic analysis of properties in the ATS user interface that 
contributed to the automation related problems that were found through the interviews. The usability heuristics 
used in the evaluation were; consistency, compatibility, feedback, error prevention and recovery, user control, 
visual clarity, explicitness and prioritisation of functionality, and information. 
The results showed that during manual control, the operators experience loss of speed and accuracy in 
performing actions together with difficulties to divide attention between performing a task and the overall 
monitoring of the turbine system status. According to the operators, the positive aspect of manual operations is 
an increased feeling of being in control when performing actions by hand. However, there is a trade off 
between the feeling of being in control and the speed and exactness of the automation. The operators handle 
this by using an intermediate step-mode, where they can take advantage of the speed of the automation at the 
same time as they maintain the feeling of control.  
With higher levels of automation, the problems shift to issues concerning difficulty to follow the automatic 
sequences and loosing track in procedures. The operators also state that it is hard to trouble-shoot failures in 
the ATS that have occurred when using a high level of automation. The difficulty of trouble-shooting an 
automatic system and reverting to manual control is a typical example of the “out of the loop” performance 
problem. When the level of automation gets higher, the information presentation becomes more important, 
since the operator needs to quickly assess the status of the automation. 
The heuristic evaluation pointed out a number of usability related concerns in the ATS interface. Poor 
visibility of the automation’s underlying conditions was a major distress since it contributed to an opaque 
interface that worsened the difficulties of trouble-shooting automation failures. Another example of poor 
usability was inconsistencies between handling of unaccepted conditions and unaccepted alarms. This was 
also confirmed by the operators to have caused errors during manual operation.  
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The results of the interviews and the heuristic evaluation of the turbine automation interface point out that a 
number of automation related problems do exist. To address these issues in future designs will be a challenge, 
since complex interdependencies have to be presented.  Increasing the observability of conditions and 
underlying program logic would be one measure to reduce the problems identified. To conclude, relevant 
information concerning the ATS status has to be provided together with the history of the automation as well 
as future actions. This is an important step to improve how the turbine automation user interface support the 
operators’ ability to take over control when shifting from automatic to manual mode in case of a failure.  
 
The final NKS report for the NKS-R AutoNewTech activity is available here. 
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NKS-R MOSACA: Safety culture - dimensions and evaluation 
Teemu Reiman 
VTT, Finland 
teemu.reiman@vtt.fi
 
Introduction 
A sound safety culture is considered a cornerstone for nuclear safety. The concept was coined in an attempt to 
gain an overview and an indicator of the safety level of the organization. The concept tried to grasp the 
subjective and social factors (such as safety attitudes, management focus) affecting safety. The concept has 
been in use in the nuclear industry since Chernobyl accident in 1986. Yet no clear and widely accepted 
definition of safety culture and of the means to develop it exists. There are two main sources of confusion. 
First, the definitions of safety culture emphasize to varying degrees the attitudes, behaviour, or knowledge of 
the personnel, with some definitions placing emphasis on the structural features of the organization. This leads 
to very different ideas about the best means of developing safety culture. Second, the definitions of safety 
culture are often generic in nature, e.g. emphasising the importance of safety values or rigorous attitudes. 
Thus, they do not take into account the varying demands of different functions operating at the power plants, 
the features of the production technology, or the life-cycle of the given unit. How does safety culture manifest 
in a design organization or construction work? Should it be different in young companies in comparison to 
mature organizations or in waste management organizations in comparison to power companies? How does 
the original design of the plant affect the requirements for safety culture (cf. Rollenhagen, submitted)? Generic 
definitions of safety culture concept lead to overgeneralizations about what is the best safety culture and 
limited usefulness of the approach in actual safety improvement.  
This project deals with the above mentioned limitations of our current understanding of safety culture concept 
and strives to clarify it with both theoretical and empirical evidence. The project aims at building and testing a 
model of safety culture which can be used as a background for developing an indicator of safety culture for 
both regulators and the power companies. Furthermore, an overview of the current nuclear safety culture in 
Finland and Sweden is obtained during the testing of the model in interviews and survey.  
The goals of MOSACA 2008-2010 project are accomplished in several stages: 
• Construct a model of safety culture (2008) 
• Empirically clarify the central characteristics of safety culture in the Nordic nuclear industry (2009) 
• Testing the model of safety culture in case studies (2010) 
• Creating recommendations on safety culture evaluation and development (2008-2010)  
Mosaca is carried out in collaboration between VTT, KTH (Carl Rollenhagen) and RiskPilot AB (Ulf 
Kahlbom). In 2009, there is additional cooperation with the University of Helsinki Department of Social and 
Moral Philosophy on the ethical and ontological aspects of safety culture. 
 
Organizational culture and safety 
In order to understand organizational safety, a model of an organization is needed. Organizational evaluation 
as well as organizational development is always driven by a model of how the organization functions and what 
to look for. Theories of safety culture seldom make explicit their underlying model of an organization, or their 
underlying model of system safety. We have tried to formulate such a model, and as a first step we have 
conceptualized organization as organizational culture. This means that we have taken culture as a root 
metaphor for organization (cf. Alvesson, 2002). The theoretical premise of our approach draws on 
interpretive-oriented theories of organizational culture. These theories share an interest in the meanings and 
beliefs the members of an organization assign to organizational elements (structures, systems and behavior) 
and how these assigned meanings influence the ways in which the members behave themselves (Schultz, 
1995; Alvesson, 2002; Weick, 1995). 
In the idea of culture as a root metaphor, “the social world is seen not as objective, tangible, and measurable 
but as constructed by people and reproduced by the networks of symbols and meanings that people share and 
make shared action possible” (Alvesson, 2002, p. 25). This means that even the technological solutions and 
tools are given meanings by their designers and users, which affect their subsequent utilization. It further 
means that concepts such as safety, reliability, human factors or organizational effectiveness are not absolute; 
rather organizations construct their meaning and act in accordance to this constructed meaning. For example, 
if the organization socially constructs a view that the essence of safety is to prevent individuals - the weakest 
links in the system - from committing errors, the countermeasures are likely to be targeted at individuals and 
include training, demotion and blaming.  
Organizational cultures are determined as much, if not more, by what they ignore (Weick, 1998) as by what 
they pay attention to and what they consider important and meaningful. In order to identify issues that are 
ignored, two things are needed; a) theory of system safety, and b) model of the main elements required to 
manage the organizational core task including taking care of the hazards (Reiman & Oedewald, in press b).  
 
Dimensions of safety culture 
We have outlined the main elements of organizational safety culture as being organizational dimensions, 
social processes, psychological properties and conceptions of the personnel and the organizational core task 
including the basic production technology (see also Reiman et al., 2008b; Reiman & Oedewald, in press a, in 
press b). The model depicts the organizational structures and processes that can be identified as influencing 
the personnel’s capability and willingness for safety conscious behaviour. These are for example; risk 
management practices, training, resourcing, change management and supervisory activity (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The four main elements of organizational culture define the frames of the organizational activity, which in turn 
influences the elements (Reiman & Oedewald, in press b). 
 
The organizational dimensions are analytical tools for considering those aspects of organizational activity that 
can be intentionally managed and influenced. Organizational safety management is carried out through these 
dimensions. It is important to note that organizational dimensions are tools, not ends as such. They are tools to 
monitor and control the technology and the social processes and influence the psychological states of the 
personnel. 
Social processes shape practices, create meaning and social order and facilitate change. Social processes 
manifest as intentional changes, unintentional variations, trade-offs, gradual local adjustments and 
reinterpretations of organizational activities and demands of work. Social processes can be seen as social 
mechanisms that “quietly” lead the organization to its current state of organizational and psychological 
dimensions. These processes include formation of social identity, optimizing of practices and sensemaking (cf. 
Weick, 1995; Snook, 2000) Social processes are the clue that makes culture a shared phenomenon (Reiman & 
Oedewald, in press b; cf. Rollenhagen, submitted). 
The psychological properties such as sense of control and understanding of the organizational core task can be 
viewed as being the core element of an organizational safety culture. A measure of these dimensions indicates 
how well the personnel are currently coping with the demands of the organizational core task, and how much 
effort they have to exert to get to job done with sufficient quality. Whether or not these subjective perceptions 
of the personnel have a factual and objective content at the time of the perception, the effect they have on 
human performance is factual.  
The organizational core task denotes the shared objective or purpose of organizational activity (e.g. 
guaranteeing safe and efficient production of electricity by light boiling water nuclear reactor). The physical 
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object of the work activity (e.g. particular power plant, manufacturing plant, offshore platform), the objective 
of the work, and the society and environment (e.g. deregulated electricity market, harsh winter weather) set 
constraints and requirements for the fulfilment of the organizational core task. The core task of the 
organization sets demands (constraints and requirements) for the activity and should be kept in mind when 
making evaluations of the organizational solutions or performance. The organizational core task has three 
main dimensions (Reiman, 2007): 
- objective of work 
- characteristics of the object of work 
- external influences 
The inherent hazards of the work are defined by the organizational core task. These in turn are interpreted 
within the organizational culture where the appropriate means to overcome the hazards are defined and carried 
out. Thus, the operational risk level of the organization is dependent on this subjective interpretation of the 
hazards. 
 
Evaluation of safety culture 
We state that an organization has a high potential for safety when safety is genuinely valued and the members 
of the organization are motivated to put effort on achieving high levels of safety, and it is understood that 
safety is a complex phenomenon (Reiman & Oedewald, in press a, b). Safety is understood as a property of an 
entire system and not just absence of incidents, people feel personally responsible for safety of the entire 
system, they feel that they can have an effect on safety, the organizations aims for understanding hazards and 
anticipating the risks in their activities, the organization is alert to the possibility of unanticipated events and 
there exists good prerequisites for carrying out the daily work. 
One of the challenges in defining the criteria is that safety is a complex phenomenon that is not easy to define 
in measurable terms. Sometimes the definitions are simplistic in order to be able to more easily gather data on 
them, e.g. the number of workers without adequate personal protective equipment (negative indicator of safety 
culture) or the number times a manager visits the shop floor (positive indicator of safety culture) (Reiman et 
al., 2008a). 
The crucial question at the evaluation of safety culture is how much is “good enough”? In other words, the 
evaluator needs to decide on the standards used to make judgments about the key findings (Reiman & 
Oedewald, in press a). Even if one has clinched a set of elements of organizational safety, the data always 
needs interpretation. There is no valid survey or interview technique that can provide a straightforward 
evaluation of such a complex phenomenon as organizational safety. For example, if one of the criteria in the 
evaluation were the employees’ understanding of hazards and the evaluator finds that almost all the 
interviewed employees do understand most of the hazards, but none understand all of them, is it reasonable to 
expect a perfect understanding? Can the level of understanding be said to be high if there are gaps in it?  
Another crucial issue at this stage is the connection between various criteria. The main question is: does the 
organization have to be good on every criterion, or is it enough to score excellent on a few? For example, if 
the evaluator in the previous example found that the employees are highly motivated towards spending effort 
on safety (criteria), feel personally responsible for the safety of the plant (criteria) and have received good 
training on safety issues (criteria), but feel stressed and overburdened by work (criteria), should she count a 
mean value from three high, one moderate and one low score? Or should she write a qualitative judgment 
from all the available information, which includes a warning on the long-term effects of stress on performance 
and work practices? (see also Reiman et al., 2008a) 
 
Continuation of the project in 2009-2010 
During 2009 the goal is to empirically clarify the central characteristics and shared or differing viewpoints on 
safety culture in the Nordic nuclear industry. This is done as an interview study involving all the Nordic 
power companies, both regulators and several consultants and technical support organizations. In 2010, in-
depth case studies are planned to be carried out at selected organizations. The aim of the case studies is to test 
the safety culture model and evaluate the level of safety culture at the case organizations. The model and 
theory on safety culture is revised according to the case results. During the duration of the entire project, an 
aim is to create advice and recommendations on safety culture evaluation and development in the nuclear 
industry. 
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Application of the results 
Research contributes to the understanding of organizational factors and especially safety culture, and their 
relation to nuclear safety. The results of the project can be utilized in safety culture assessment and 
development initiatives carried out by the power companies, outside evaluators or the regulator. The project 
will create common guidelines for both power companies and regulators on how safety culture should be 
assessed and what regulations can be applied to it. The model of safety culture can provide clues for important 
dimensions to consider in the evaluation and as a guide in data collection and analysis. The model can also be 
used in integrating the various data that the power plant already has collected concerning e.g. their safety 
management system, safety climate, and job satisfaction. The safety culture model can be utilized in event 
investigations as a heuristic tool for considering the organizational, social and cognitive elements relevant to 
the event in addition to the situation specific factors. This consideration could shed more light on questions 
such as why the workers behaved as they did and why the organization failed in noticing the development of 
the incident. Finally, the results of the project can be utilized in assessing the safety implications of 
organizational changes. The possible safety effects of changes can be evaluated with the help of the 
dimensions depicted in the model.  
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NKS-B BIODOS: Biodosimetry application in emergency preparedness; 
NKS-B BIOPEX: Emergency preparedness exercise for biological dosimetry 
Carita Lindholm1, Wendla Paile1, Daniela Stricklin2 and Alicja Jaworska3 
1Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, STUK, Finland 
2Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, Sweden 
3Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, NRPA, Norway 
Carita.Lindholm@stuk.fi
 
Abstract 
The BIODOS and BIOPEX studies have aimed at establishing a dose calibration curve for a feasible PCC-ring 
assay and to apply it in a simulated, mass casualty accident. The PCC assay was validated against the 
conventional dicentric assay. A linear relationship was established for PCC rings after 60Co irradiation with 
doses up to 20 Gy. The testing of the PCC ring technique was performed by direct comparison to the 
conventional dicentric assay, both conducted with a triage approach that gives a crude dose estimate through 
analysis of a relatively small number of cells. Altogether 62 blood samples were analysed, each irradiated with 
an individual dose using 60Co γ-rays, and representing casualties in a simulated radiation accident. Doses 
ranged from zero dose up to a lethal whole body dose of 13 Gy. The results indicated that both triage assays 
were capable of discerning non-exposed cases and that in the uniform irradiations, the dose estimates based on 
data from both assays were fairly consistent with the given dose. However, differences were observed 
depending on the dose level. At doses about 5 Gy and below, dicentric scoring resulted in more accurate 
whole-body dose estimates than PCC rings. At high doses, PCC rings appeared to give more accurate dose 
estimates than dicentrics. In non-uniform irradiations, neither assay enabled accurate estimation of either dose 
or fraction of cells irradiated. In conclusion, the study demonstrated that the PCC ring assay is suitable for use 
as a biodosimeter, although it is not superior to the dicentric assay. PCC rings are especially suitable for 
estimation of high doses.    
 
Introduction  
In the event of radiological accidents, a number of dose assessment techniques are available. Biological 
dosimetry provides an approach to determine the quantity of radiation exposure. When the number of 
casualties is large, there is a need for a method that allows for a fast and reliable dose evaluation that may be 
crucial for early decision of medical care. Biodosimetry also provides information on inhomogeneous 
exposure thus helping to recognize patients to develop severe local reactions. The classical dicentric method is 
generally considered the best of the biodosimetry methods, but it is relatively time-consuming and requires 
adequate training for successful determination of dose. Also, very high doses cannot be accurately assessed. 
Several biological techniques have challenged the dicentric method, one of them the PCC method, which is 
based on the analysis of cells where chromatin has been prematurely condensed with the help of either 
chemicals or fusion with mitotic cells from another species. 
In the BIODOS project, our goal was to establish a feasible PCC assay for large scale radiological accidents. 
In the work performed during the BIOPEX project, the aim was to compare and validate the PCC ring assay 
with respect to the routinely applied dicentric assay in a triage mode.  
 
Material and methods 
BIODOS. 
As the outcome of the BIODOS project, the PCC ring assay using okadaic acid was considered as the most 
feasible approach for mass casualty application among several tested assay variants. PCC ring frequencies 
were evaluated at both STUK and FOI for seven dose points and the data were fitted to a linear equation. 
Blood samples were exposed to 60Co γ-rays with a dose rate of 0.3 Gy / min. Irradiations were performed in a 
water bath with a fixed temperature of 37 ºC. Cultures were established using RPMI 1640 medium with 20% 
FCS, 1% PHA, 1% L-glutamine and 1% penicillin-streptomycin. A lymphocyte density of at least 0.5 x 106 
cells / ml in 5 ml cultures was used. For dicentric assay, colcemid (final concentration 0.2 μg/ml) was added 
for the last 2.5 h of the 48 h cultures. The PCC assay cultures obtained Okadaic acid (final concentration 500 
nM) during the last 1 h of the 48 h cultures. Ring chromosomes were scored from PCC cells and the data were 
fitted by the maximum likelihood method (Papworth 1975). Interlaboratory training and intercomparisons 
between STUK, FOI and NRPA were arranged in order to achieve uniform scoring criteria.   
BIOPEX. 
For the purpose of testing the PCC assay and the dicentric assay, a scenario of malevolent use of radiation was 
simulated by in vitro irradiation of blood samples. The scenario was based on the assumption that a very 
strong gamma source had been hidden in a public transport vehicle, giving rise to a dose rate of 20 Gy/h close 
to the source. Because of partial shielding it would be possible to get a high dose to only part of the body. In 
this scenario, 62 persons with clinical symptoms and potential exposure were evaluated. According to the 
scenario, the actual exposures spanned a broad spectrum of doses. Seven persons were supposed not to have 
been exposed at all, despite presenting with symptoms, while in the simulation, 37 persons were exposed to 
whole body doses between 0.4 Gy and 13 Gy. 18 cases received partial body doses of between 7 Gy and 13 
Gy to between 10% and 40% of the body.  These exposures were simulated by exposure of fresh blood to 
gamma radiation with a dose rate of 0.3 Gy/min. To simulate partial body exposure, exposed blood was mixed 
with unexposed blood from the same person in corresponding proportions. Similar culture conditions were 
used for BIOPEX as for BIODOS (see above). For dicentric assay, colcemid (final concentration 0.2 μg/ml) 
was added for the last 2.5 h of the 48 h cultures. From PCC preparations, the starting point was to analyse 50 
rings or 500 PCC cells per sample, whereas 30 dicentrics or 50 metaphases were to be scored for the dicentric 
assay (Lloyd et al. 2000). Uniform analysis procedures were applied in both BIODOS and BIOPEX projects. 
STUK, FOI and NRPA all participated in the scoring of the 62 samples applying defined analysis criteria. 
Established calibration curves were used to estimate the doses based on PCC rings and dicentrics. For the 
latter, each laboratory used its own calibration curve. For samples irradiated in a partial body exposure 
scenario, the dose to the exposed fraction of cells was calculated by the Dolphin method (IAEA 2001). 
 
Results and Discussion 
The work performed in BIODOS and BIOPEX projects has aimed at establishing a biodosimetry technique for 
use in large accident involving exposure to low-LET ionizing radiation and to test the assay in a simulated 
mass casualty situation. PCC ring frequencies were evaluated at both STUK and FOI for seven dose points 
and the data were fitted to a linear equation to be used for dose assessment of large scale accidents. Similar 
results have been obtained in other PCC ring studies (Lamadrid 2007, Kanda et al. 1999). 
The classic dicentric method was used as the reference technique to which the newly established PCC ring 
assay was compared. In general, the PCC ring assay was, depending on the dose, equally or somewhat less 
efficient than the dicentric assay in estimating correct dose in cases of uniform irradiations (Figure 1). Both 
triage assays were capable of discerning non-exposed cases. At doses about 5 Gy and below, dicentrics 
scoring resulted in more accurate whole-body dose estimates than PCC rings. At high doses, PCC rings 
appeared to give more accurate dose estimates than dicentrics. Applying the limited triage scoring, the 
dicentric assay was in 27 cases of 37 (with more than zero dose) capable of correctly placing cases in dose 
categories based on level of hospital care needed. For estimates from PCC ring scoring, the corresponding 
number was 21 out of 37.  
 
Figure 1. Simulated mass casualty: dose estimates for whole body exposures (44 cases) based on dicentrics or PCC rings.  
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In non-uniform irradiations, the PCC ring assay was slightly better in the approximation of the partial body 
dose than dicentrics, but neither was satisfactory. In addition, the fraction of cells irradiated could not be 
calculated with data from either of the assays. The difficulties in identifying non-uniform irradiation in this 
study originates mainly from the small number of cells analysed.   
The assay of analysing PCC rings has proven to be a suitable method for estimating doses in an accident 
involving a large number of exposed casualties and is especially applicable of estimation of high doses. Based 
on the obtained data, the general conclusion is that the PCC ring and the dicentric assays are equally efficient 
biodosimeters. 
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Background and objectives 
Thermal stratification of water can cause excessive thermal loads both in Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) and 
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). A recent example is the so-called “HTG-event” at Oskarshamn 3 in 2003, 
in which cold water was introduced near the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) while the main 
coolant pumps were switched off. The natural circulation from the decay power did not provide sufficient 
mixing, and when the main coolant pumps were restarted a rapid temperature increase occurred near the lower 
plenum. Although no harmful thermal stresses occurred in this particular event, it is an example where the 
lack of understanding of physical processes could cause a serious damage to the reactor. The HTG-event is not 
unique, and similar incidents have occurred in other BWRs around the world. 
There are several other examples of stratification issues which are relevant also for PWRs. Stratification in 
horizontal PWR surge lines is a well-known case in which hot water from the pressurizer passes over a layer 
with cold water, leading to time dependent temperature fluctuations and a risk for thermal fatigue. Another 
PWR-related example is stratification and insufficient mixing in the downcomer caused by the injection of 
cold water through the cold leg. This can lead to thermal striping and Pressurized Thermal Shocks (PTS) in 
the downcomer. Stratification and temperature fluctuations at pipe junctions with dead ends can also be a 
potential problem in which stratification is an important physical phenomenon. This case, which is valid both 
for BWR and PWR, becomes particularly important if the dead end is connected to a leaking valve that can 
cause a small supply of cold water. 
The objective of the present project (StratRev) is to perform a review of available validation experiments and 
State-of-the-Art in modelling of stratification and mixing in the primary system of Light Water Reactors. The 
work is restricted to single-phase flow, but still the current topic covers a wide range of flow phenomena such 
as stratification, heat transfer, natural convection and buoyancy-driven flow, flow instabilities, turbulent 
mixing etc. Even laminar-turbulent transition can be of importance.  
The project contains the following main tasks: 
• Summarize known problems related to stratification and mixing phenomena in nuclear power plants. 
An import input to this task is the workshop on stratification that was organized as part of the 
StratRev-project. This will be further described in a separate section.  
• Review existing experimental studies related to stratification in the RPV and the primary system 
piping. 
• Review current modelling capabilities for stratification, natural convection and mixing relevant for the 
RPV and the primary system piping. 
• Provide suggestions for possible continuation projects (research projects) 
The project is ended and the work has been summarized in a written report. 
 
BWR-OG Workshop on thermal stratification 
A workshop on Thermal Stratification was organized within the StratRev-project in co-operation with BWR 
Owner’s Group (BWR-OG). The workshop was held in Älvkarleby, Sweden, June 3-4, 2008, and the 
workshop attracted more than 50 participants both from industry and academia and with different nationalities 
(Sweden, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, USA, England, Netherlands).  
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The first day of the workshop was mainly focussed on plant experiences related to thermal stratification 
phenomena, with presentations from different utilities. The presentations showed that the HTG-event in 
Oskarshamn is not a unique event, and a few similar cases were described. A number of other plant events 
related to stratification were also described. The majority of the presentations during the second day 
considered CFD-modelling of mixing and stratification. 
The workshop ended with a final discussion focussing on whether there is a need for further analysis in this 
topic. A quite wide range of opinions were given, and below follows a summary of some of the comments: 
• Stratification and mixing are important phenomena that can occur, and they can also affect the 
integrity of systems and components 
• The analysis of the various thermal transients described at the workshop showed small usage factors 
(typically of the order of 0.001). Also when taking into account possible life time extensions it can be 
difficult to motivate further analysis based on theses small usage factors. 
• There is a general interest for improved understanding, for example: 
o What can cause stratification (forces that enhance stratification)? 
o What counteracts stratification (What is required to break-up a stratified layer?) 
o There is a need to analyze various types of events/scenarios in order to gain understanding  
• The possibility to reduce operational restrictions can be a motivation for further analysis and research. 
For example, the possibility to avoid cold shutdown under certain circumstances, or the possibility to 
reduce current restrictions on the restart of the main circulation pumps, can both result in financial 
savings for the utilities. 
• It is important with similar technical specifications and limitations in different plants 
• There is a lack of knowledge and procedures that should be applied following this type of events. 
 
Review of existing experimental studies and current modelling capabilities 
In the review of existing experimental studies on stratification in the RPV, the references are divided into two 
categories: integral large-scale experiments and separate effect experiments. Experiments belonging to the 
first category are often designed to develop and test passive safety systems and for the assessment of system 
codes. Separate effect experiments are usually more suitable for model development and code validation. In 
order to be suitable for validation of methods based on Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), it is important 
that the boundary conditions are well-documented and that the results include some kind of flow field 
documentation (velocity measurements). 
Thermal stratification in piping and in the RPV are inherently three-dimensional phenomena that are often 
localized both in space and time. Therefore, three-dimensional CFD calculations are needed in order to 
provide an accurate description. However, the computer time and the resources needed in construction of CFD 
models for complicated geometries limit the usability of CFD methods. How to make appropriate geometry 
simplifications is thus an important task in order to succeed when applying CFD-methods to the described 
stratification events. In many situations it is not even possible to use CFD-methods, and system codes are 
frequently used despite their limited capabilities of describing three-dimensional phenomena. Another 
important issue is the spatial distribution of the core power distribution and its influence on the flow patterns 
in the RPV.  
 
Possible continuation projects 
It is desirable to take actions in order to reduce the probability for stratification to occur, but also to develop 
well-validated and accepted tools and procedures for analyzing upcoming stratification events. The questions 
that should be considered to a greater extent are the following:  
1. What is the possible impact of stratification events on the RPV structures? 
2. What can be done to prevent the occurrence of thermal transients? 
3. What means should be taken in case of a stratification event? 
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A fairly ambitious research plan has been outlined in the final report of the project covering the above 
questions, but also a few suggestions regarding more limited research activities have been given. The ultimate 
goal is to establish Best Practice Guidelines that can be followed both by utilities and authorities in case of an 
event including stratification and thermal loads. 
An important activity that requires further attention is validation of different computational methods with 
relevant test cases. Since many of the stratification events results in thermal loads that are localized in time 
and space, CFD is a (the) suitable tool. However, the often very large and complex geometry implies that CFD 
cannot be applied to the entire RPV. When possible it is desirable to divide the problem in smaller domains 
that can be analyzed with CFD, and it is also important to perform a step-by-step increase in complexity with 
intermediate validation versus relevant experimental data.  
The fact that CFD cannot be applied to the entire RPV also emphasizes the importance of other methods that 
can be applied to this type of flow problems. For example modelling the complicated flow inside the reactor 
core is such a problem that is not feasible today with current CFD-methods, and it is thus important to 
continue to develop and validate integral methods that can be applied. It is also important to use a statistical 
approach to quantify modelling uncertainties. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The presentations given by different utilities at the stratification workshop showed that stratification issues are 
not unusual, and a number of different examples were given. However, the analysis of the different thermal 
transients all showed small usage factors, which raised questions whether current high-temperature alarms and 
operating restrictions after pump trips are relevant. Nevertheless, it is a fact that uncontrolled thermal 
transients have caused long and costly production stops during the period when the possible safety effects of 
the transients are analyzed, and it is likely that such events will occur also in the future.  
Today there is a lack of knowledge and procedures that should be applied in case of upcoming stratification 
events, and the ultimate goal is to establish Best Practice Guidelines that can be applied. This requires 
validation and assessment of currently available computational tools.  
A fairly ambitious research plan has been outlined in the final report, but also a few suggestions regarding 
more limited research activities have been given. The reference group of NORTHNET Roadmap 2 has 
recently been requested to provide a ranking of the suggested continuation projects in order to identify the 
projects/tasks that they consider to be important. 
NKS-R POOL: Experiments and modelling of pressure suppression pools 
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1VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland  
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Introduction 
In a hypothetical loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), a large amount of vapor is released after a break of a main 
steam line into the drywell compartment of a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). When pressure increases in the 
drywell compartment, air and vapor flow through vent pipes into a wetwell compartment. The vent pipes are 
submerged in a pressure suppression pool, which changes a large volume of vapor into a small volume of 
water. 
In the POOL project, the thermal hydraulic phenomena and the pressure loads in the drywell and wetwell 
compartments are studied. Experiments are performed with the pressurized PPOOLEX facility at the 
Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT) [1]. PPOOLEX consists of down-scaled models of drywell and 
wetwell compartments. At VTT, Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and Finite Element (FE) modelling of 
the experiments is performed [2]. Modelling of thermal stratification experiments of the water pool with the 
GOTHIC code is done at the Royal Institute of Technology [3]. The NKS-R project POOL is reviewed in the 
following. 
 
Experiments with the PPOOLEX facility 
A test facility including adequate models of the drywell and wetwell compartments and withstanding 
prototypical system pressure (0.5 MPa) has been taken in use at LUT in 2007–2008 (Figure 1). Wall 
condensation in the drywell and direct-contact condensation in the wetwell can be examined and scenarios in 
terms of condensation modes, as well as thermal stratification threatening the integrity of pool structures can 
be studied. Investigation of the steam/gas injection phenomenon requires high-grade measuring techniques. 
Therefore, a kHz-range data acquisition system and high speed cameras are employed. 
Dry well
Wet well
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Blowdown pipe
DN300 windows 
for visual 
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Intermediate 
floor
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well and wet well
DN100       
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Figure 1. PPOOLEX test facility. Figure 2. Collar of the blowdown pipe. 
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A series of characterizing experiments with air/steam discharge was carried out in 2007 to observe the general 
behaviour of the facility. Experiments on the discharge of non-condensable gas (air) to the drywell 
compartment and from there through one blowdown pipe into the condensation pool related to the very first 
seconds of a postulated large-break LOCA inside the containment were also conducted in 2007. Wall 
condensation in the drywell compartment was studied and verification data for CFD calculations at VTT 
produced in 2008. Experiments to investigate the effect of a collar attached to the blowdown pipe outlet on the 
pressure loading of the pool were carried out in the beginning of 2009 (Figure 2). 
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Figure 3. Effect of steam discharge rate on mixing and development of stratification in the wet well pool. On the left, 
steam mass flux in the blowdown pipe is about 2.2 kg/sm2 and on the right, about 5.6 kg/sm2. 
 
In the thermal stratification experiments in 2008, the effect of steam discharge rate on mixing and 
development of stratification layers in the pool volume was of interest (Figure 3). In addition, verification data 
for GOTHIC calculations at KTH were produced. Several thermocouples were added to the pool based on the 
information from the pre-calculations by KTH in order to measure accurately the characteristics of thermal 
stratification and mixing. 
 
CFD and FE modeling of the pressure loads 
The PPOOLEX experiments have been modelled with CFD and FE calculations. Discharges, where only air is 
blown into the drywell, have been modelled by using the Volume Of Fluid (VOF) model of the commercial 
FLUENT CFD code. The VOF model is based on tracing the interface between gas and water and it is suitable 
for describing large bubbles in the water pool. Discharges where vapour is blown into the drywell have been 
modelled by using the Euler-Euler multiphase model of FLUENT, which can describe well the behaviour of 
small bubbles. Wall-condensation model and a simple version of direct contact condensation model have been 
implemented in FLUENT by using user-defined functions. 
In Figure, temperature in the PPOOLEX device is shown at different instants of time in an experiment, where 
air is blown into the drywell. When pressure increases inside the vessel, the temperature also increases 
because of adiabatic compression of the gas. In the gas space of the wetwell, strong thermal stratification 
occurs because of density differences of hot and cold air. 
The pressure loads and the strains and displacements of the pool structures have been analyzed by performing 
Fluid-Structure Interaction (FSI) calculations of the PPOOLEX experiments. In FSI calculations, motion of 
the structures is taken into account when the pressure loads are calculated. The Star-CD code is used for CFD 
and the ABAQUS code for structural analysis. The codes are coupled by using the MpCCI middleware. 
Calculations of the experiments have been numerically unstable with the explicit FSI coupling scheme of 
MpCCI. Therefore, a linear perturbation method has been developed and validated for preventing the 
instability. 
 
 
Figure 4. Formation of thermal stratification in the gas space of a PPOOLEX experiment, where air is blown into the 
pressurized facility. CFD simulation is performed with the FLUENT code. 
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Figure 5. Formation of gas bubble at the vent outlet in the pressure suppression pool. Comparison of FSI calculation to 
experimental results obtained at PPOOLEX facility. 
When pressure increases in the drywell, air is blown through the vent pipe into the water pool of the wetwell. 
In Figure 5, FSI calculation of formation of the first air bubble in the water pool is compared to an 
experimental result at different instants of time. The simulation results show that it is necessary to take into 
account fluid-structure interaction in calculation of the pressure load. Ignoring FSI leads to qualitatively 
incorrect results for the wall pressure in the PPOOLEX facility. 
 
Prediction of thermal stratification and mixing in the pool 
Reliable prediction of the pool thermal-hydraulics including thermal stratification and mixing phenomena 
presents a computational challenge. First of all, lumped-parameter models fail to provide consistent 
description of thermal stratification. One-dimensional models have problems with taking into account of real 
geometry of the nuclear power plant pool. On the other hand, high-order-accurate CFD (RANS, LES, DNS) 
methods are not practical in engineering analysis due to excessive computing power necessary to calculate 3D 
high-Rayleigh-number natural convection flows, especially in long (~hours) transients. 
GOTHIC was selected as appropriate tool in the present project because it combines system code features with 
lumped volumes and semi-empirical correlations for heat and mass transfer processes with CFD-like approach 
with distributed parameter model which allow us to resolve spatial flow and temperature fields. 
For assessment of the reliability of GOTHIC in predicting thermal stratification, validation of the code was 
performed against POOLEX experiments. Lumped parameter model of GOTHIC was used for prediction of 
heat balance and heat losses in the open pool experiment POOLEX STB-20 to define boundary conditions 
necessary for the 2D distribution parameter simulations [3]. 
In Figure 6, results of grid convergence study and comparison with experimental results are presented for 2D 
GOTHIC simulation of stratification. Several grids were used for grid convergence study. Further analysis 
was performed with grid 48×118 which gives reasonable balance between accuracy of the analysis and 
computational time. In Figure 7, development of stratification in the pool during steam injection and cooling 
phase with no steam injection are shown. One can see in Figure and Figure that GOTHIC code can reliably 
predict thermal-hydraulics of the pool and thermal stratification. 
 
                         a)                                                  b)                                                  c) 
Figure 6. Grid convergence and comparison with experimental data for vertical temperature distribution at different 
times. Grids used 12x30, 24x59, 48x118, 48x236.  a) 14000 sec; b) 30000 sec; c) 100000 sec. 
t = 1.53 1.74 1.94 s
  
                   a)                      b)                      c)                      d)                      e)                        f) 
Figure 7. Development of stratification (0-14600 sec) during steam injection and cooling phase with no steam injection 
(14600-100000 sec): a) 500 sec; b) 5000 sec; c) 14600 sec; d) T=20000 sec; e) T=50000 sec; f) 100000 sec. 
 
Summary and discussion 
In the NKS-R project POOL, thermal hydraulic phenomena and pressure loads in a pressure suppression 
containment of a BWR are studied. Experiments have been performed with the pressurized PPOOLEX facility 
with air and steam discharges. Experiments have provided data on wall condensation in the drywell and on the 
behaviour of air and steam in the water pool of the wetwell. Thermal stratification has been studied at different 
mixing conditions of the water pool. 
The Volume Of Fluid model has been successfully used for CFD simulation of air discharges in the 
PPOOLEX device. The main features of the bubble dynamics in the water pool are fairly well described in the 
simulation model. The wall condensation model implemented in the Euler–Euler CFD model has been tested 
and promising results have been obtained. The fluid-structure interaction calculations have shown that FSI 
effects have to be taken into account in order to obtain realistic results for the PPOOLEX experiments. 
GOTHIC code validation against POOLEX experiments shows reasonable accuracy in prediction of thermal 
stratification in a pool during long (tens of hours) transients. In the next step, validation of GOTHIC will be 
performed against PPOOLEX data with stratification and mixing in the pool for the case of high mass flux of 
steam blowdown. 
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Introduction 
Reindeer husbandry is the part of Nordic food production most vulnerable to radioactive contamination. The 
Chernobyl fallout had dramatic consequences for reindeer husbandry in central Sweden and central and 
southern Norway, and still (in 2009), twenty-three years after the Chernobyl accident, monitoring and 
countermeasures are required in 10 Norwegian and 16 Swedish reindeer herding districts before animals can 
be slaughtered for trade (i.e., contain less than 3000 Bq kg-1 in Norway and less than 1500 Bq kg-1 in Sweden).  
The supposedly one-year long NKS-B project “Regional differences in reindeer radiocaesium contamination” 
(REIN) was initiated in 2004 with the aim of reviewing the long-term data on radiocaesium in reindeer and 
studying potential regional differences in food-chain radiocaesium transfer. For various reasons there have 
been a number of delays in the project. However, the slow progress has made possible the identification of a 
much slower decline in radiocaesium concentrations in reindeer during the last years compared to the first 10-
15 years after the Chernobyl fallout. The current slower decline in contamination levels in Scandinavian 
reindeer is the focus of this abstract. 
 
Long-term trends in radiocaesium concentrations in reindeer  
Following the Chernobyl fallout, average radiocaesium concentrations in reindeer in central Sweden and 
Norway reached 40-50 kBq/kg, about an order of magnitude higher than the highest concentrations observed 
in the 1960s after the nuclear weapons fallout.  
During the first ~10 years after the accident, the 137Cs concentrations in reindeer in winter declined with 
effective half-times of 3-5 years (Åhman and Åhman, 1994; Gaare et al. 2000; Skuterud et al., 2005). This rate 
of decline was similar to that observed in lichens (Gaare et al., 2000; Åhman, 2005; Lehto et al., 2008), and 
reflected the role of contaminated lichens in the diet of reindeer. However, from the mid 1990s onwards 
slower rates of decline in reindeer were observed both in Sweden and Norway (Åhman et al., 2001; Skuterud 
et al., 2005).  
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Figure 1. Average 137Cs concentrations in autumn and early winter in reindeer in the Vågå reindeer herding district 
(Norway). • indicates observed concentrations during July-October; ο indicates concentrations observed during 
November-May. The curves are fitted single- and double-exponential models to values observed during September and 
November-January, respectively (data from the Reindeer Husbandry Administration; results for the period up to 2003 
were presented in Skuterud et al. (2005)). See Table for parameter details. 
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Table 1. Estimated effective half-times (± standard error) for 137Cs in reindeer during different seasons in the Vågå herd. 
Teff (1-10) and Teff (10-20) give estimated half-times during year 1-10 and 10-20 after the Chernobyl accident, 
respectively.  
Double-exponential 
model  Herding district Season Teff (all years), year 
Teff (1-10) , 
year 
Teff (10-20), 
year 
Teff1, year Teff2, year 
Vågå September 
Nov-Jan 
9.2±2.1 
4.99±0.29 
4.10±0.64 
3.91±0.42 
No decline 
6.6±1.5 
- 
2.98±0.87 
- 
27±84 (ns) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the 137Cs concentrations in reindeer of one of the best studied Norwegian herding districts, 
and Table 1 gives various estimated effective half-times for 137Cs in these animals from 1986 onwards. There 
has been no significant decline in concentrations in reindeer in this district in autumn from the mid 1990s. 
Furthermore, the winter contamination levels during 1986-2007 were best approximated by a double-
exponential model with short- and long-term half-times of about 3 and 27 years (the latter not being 
statistically significant). 
As indicated in Fig. 1, the systematic and pronounced increase in 137Cs concentrations in reindeer from 
autumn to winter observable the first years after the Chernobyl fallout disappeared in Vågå by the late 1990s. 
A plausible explanation is that the initially large difference in contamination levels in the dietary items lichens 
and green plants had been reduced due to the continuous decline in contamination levels in lichens. Different 
species of green plants show different long-term trends in 137Cs contamination, and in some species the 
decline is non-detectable a few years after fallout (e.g., Rissanen et al., 2005). Consequently, in the long-term 
contamination levels in reindeer will be governed by the dietary components with the slowest decline. 
However, the reindeer’s slower excretion of radiocaesium during winter (Holleman et al. 1971) will be 
expected to increase their body concentrations in this season even when the summer and winter diets have 
similar radiocaesium concentrations. 
In the comprehensive study of long-term trends in 137Cs concentrations in Swedish reindeer herds in various 
seasons, Åhman (2007) showed that the effective half-time during the first 10 years after the Chernobyl 
accident was considerably shorter than in the period 10-20 years after the accident. An aggregated analysis of 
all the Swedish herds resulted in average effective half-times for the season November-December of about 3.5 
and 7 years during the periods 1-10 and 10-20 years after the Chernobyl accident, respectively (Åhman 2007), 
corresponding to the values for the Norwegian herd above. 
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Figure 2. Concentrations of 137Cs in reindeer from the five Swedish herding districts Idre, Ruhvten, Mittådalen, 
Handölsdalen and Tåssåsen during winter (November-April). The values of each district have been corrected for 
differences in contamination levels and pooled (see text for details). Each dot is average of minimum 10 animals (usually 
30 animals). The curve is a fitted double-exponential model with half-times of 2.5 and 30.8 years (standard error 
intervals: 2.20-2.87 and -32.8-10.5). 
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Figure 2 presents an analysis of concentrations in reindeer during winter in the five southernmost Swedish 
herding districts. Linear regression with log transformed concentration values were used to quantify 
differences in contamination levels between the districts. Thereafter the concentration values in the various 
districts were normalized before fitting a double-exponential model to the pooled dataset. The parameters of 
the double-exponential model indicate that the 137Cs concentrations in reindeer during winter declined with 
short- and long-term effective half-times of 2.5 and 30.8 years, respectively. However, as for the Norwegian 
herd above, the decline of the slow component is not statistically significant.  
As opposed to the situation in the Norwegian herding district presented above, there are still pronounced 
seasonal variations in 137Cs concentrations in reindeer in most of the Swedish herds studied by Åhman (2007). 
In some districts this may be a result of migration to areas of higher deposition in winter.  
A general lack of relevant time-series vegetation data is a limitation in the analysis of long-term trends in 
radiocaesium concentrations in reindeer. In the model development by Åhman (2007) this was solved by 
including two groups of unknown vegetation with different transfer values and half-times. The modelling 
results showed that the dietary components mainly governing the radiocaesium concentrations in reindeer 
during winter was lichens (71 % of the diet; with an effective ecological half-time of 3 years) and an 
introduced group of “unknown vegetation” (called Veg II) which comprised 6 % of the diet and had an 
effective half-time of 30 years. This half-time corresponds well with that observed in the Norwegian and 
Swedish herds above.  
 
Conclusions 
The underlying processes (i.e., the change in significance of lichens and plants to the intake of 137Cs by 
reindeer) suggest that exponential models with more than one time-dependent component will reasonable 
describe long-term trends in radiocaesium contamination in reindeer. This is supported by the analysis by 
Åhman (2007). However, due to the variability in the concentrations in reindeer it may be difficult to identify 
statistically significant components of such models, and methodologically this approach may therefore be 
questionable. In the REIN project we nevertheless chose double-exponential models as base models, as they 
are ecologically reasonable. 
The analyses of trends in 137Cs in Scandinavian reindeer performed in REIN suggest that concentrations 
currently decline with half-times of about 30 years. I.e., it appears that the physical decay of 137Cs is now the 
process dominating the long-term trend. This time-trend indicate that countermeasures and monitoring of 
reindeer in the contaminated areas of Sweden and Norway will probably be needed for at least another 10 to 
20 years. 
The persistent contamination problems in Swedish and Norwegian reindeer herding warrant further studies 
into the long-term soil-to-plant transfer of radiocaesium in relevant vegetation species. Further elucidation of 
the long-term 137Cs trends in reindeer requires such studies. 
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Introduction 
The GAPRAD activity - Filling knowledge gaps in radiation protection methodologies for non-human biota 
funded as part of the NKS B-programme started in May 2007 and was completed by December 2008. The 
activity has been conducted as a collaborative effort between the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 
University of Lund in Sweden, RISØ national laboratory in Denmark and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in 
Finland. The main aim of the activity was to identify data on activity concentrations of Po-210 in soil, plants, 
invertebrates and small mammals. In addition, there were plans to measure concentration of natural 
radionuclides like U-238, U-234, Ra-226, Ra-228, Po-210, Pb-210 in fish, brackish waters and sediments 
where practicable and to attain new information on gastrointestinal update and residence time in mammals 
(using "man" as the reference species) through experimentation.  
 
Setting the scene 
The deliverable report “Knowledge gaps in relation to radionuclide levels and transfer to wild plants and 
animals, in the context of environmental impact assessements, and a strategy to fill them.” (Brown, 2009) sets 
the scene for the work conducted in the GAPRAD project. The objective of the deliverable report was to 
provide an overview of the coverage of information available in relation to radionuclide levels for natural 
radionuclides and transfer in the environment, within the context of established environmental impact 
assessment frameworks. In this way, knowledge gaps can be easily identified. Once this initial step had been 
taken the second objective was to formulate a strategy concerning how these information gaps might be filled, 
thereby providing a roadmap for a further study within this NKS Research Project. 
The method applied for the deliverable report was simply to access databases and reviews conducted recently 
in the context of the development of environmental impact assessment approaches. The focus of the work was 
on natural decay series radionuclides (238U and 232Th decay series radionuclides with half-lives > 10 days1). 
This entailed: 
• Summarising information from the ERICA project (see Larsson, 2008):  three empirical databases have 
been collated within the ERICA project with respect to terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems. 
These data were analysed in the study to provide an overview as to where data gaps exist. 
• Analyses of other recently published data 
Consideration of the transfer databases in ERICA for the terrestrial environment shows that the coverage for 
Pb is reasonable presumably reflecting the large number of stable element studies that have been conducted on 
this element. Other radioelements are more poorly characterised with empirical data sets. In the case of 
polonium, some information is available for flora but are very limited for fauna where only data on a few 
species of mammals are available. In the latter case it should be noted that although 36 data are available these 
represent all mammals from a single geographical area - the UK, and these are largely on data for mammals 
forming components of the human diet. The number of values associated with thorium is low. In all cases the 
number of available empirical values is below 20 and for seven reference categories no information is 
available at all. A similar situation exists for uranium, although arguably, floral reference organisms are 
endowed with reasonable CR information. For radium there are severe data deficiencies for invertebrates e.g. 
insects and vertebrates like amphibia and reptiles. The data coverage for Pb in the ERICA transfer database 
for freshwater ecosystems is extremely poor – no data are available for any reference organism although it 
may be assumed that an extended review of stable element data might lead to the extraction of at least some 
information to mitigate this situation. CR values for Th are limited to a small number of data for fish and 
vascular plants. Although coverage of U and Po is slightly improved on this there are conspicuous data gaps 
                                                 
1 This half-life cutoff has been selected owing to the fact that radionuclides with half-lives < 10 days have been 
included in the dose-conversion coefficients (DCC) of their parent radionuclides. In other words secular 
equilibrium with the parent is assumed and no explicit transfer or DCC for these particular radionuclides are 
required. 
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including one for aquatic birds, mammals and insect larvae. Furthermore, there are no reported data for Po in 
benthic fish or U in bivalve mollusc. It was evident that some of these data deficiencies could be easily 
mitigated with limited, but focussed effort involving field-work and analysis. Some of the key findings from 
the project are provided below. 
 
210Po and 210Pb in freshwater and brackish water environments 
Lake water and fish for 210Po and 210Pb analyses were sampled in 2007 from four lakes in Finland: Iso-
Ahvenainen, Myllyjärvi, Vesijako and Miestämä. Five fish species were studied: perch (Perca fluviatilis), pike 
(Esox lucius), bream (Abramis brama,), white fish (Coregonus lavaretus) and vendace (Coregonus albula). 
Lake mussel (Anodonta sp.) and water samples were collected from lake Keurusselkä in 2007. Additionally, 
fish samples from various parts of the Baltic Sea and from lakes, belonging to the monitoring programme of 
STUK in 2005, were analysed for Po and Pb. Furthermore, a benthic isopod (Saduria entomon) and a bird, 
swan (Cygnus olor), were collected from the environments of Finnish nuclear power plants in Loviisa. 
Activity concentrations of 210Po in whole fish varied more than 210Po in lake water from the same lakes, with 
concentrations from 1.0 Bq/kg f.w. to 6.5 Bq/kg f.w. The lowest values for 210Po and 210Pb were found in pike-
perch and the highest in bream. Contents of 210Pb in fishes were much lower (5-15 times lower) than those of 
210Po, 210Pb activity concentration varying from 0.09 to 1.3 Bq/kg f.w. In edible part of the fish, highest 
concentrations for both isotopes were measured in vendace. Activity concentration of 210Po and especially that 
of 210Pb in freshwater mussel, Anodonta sp., were somewhat higher than that in fishes (with an exception of 
bream).  
Both 210Po and 210Pb concentrations in water from various parts of the Baltic Sea were lower than in lake 
waters, although values for 210Po were in most cases below the detection limit, which was estimated to be 
0.002 Bq/kg water.  Two parallel analyses were also carried out in various parts of the swan; breast muscle, 
liver and bones. 210Po in liver was ten times higher and 210Pb six times higher than in breast muscle. Activity 
concentrations of 210Po and 210Pb in whole swan were estimated to be 1.0 and 0.4 Bq/kg f.w. In Saduria 
entomon from the Gulf of Finland, activity concentration of 210Po was four times higher and 210Pb almost the 
same than that in the freshwater mussel (Anodonta sp.). Among the organisms studied, the highest activity 
concentration of 210Po was found in the crustacean Saduria entomon. Further information on the sample 
preparation, analyses methods and detailed results is provided in (Gjelsvik & Brown, 2009). 
The data produced within the GAPRAD project were used to derive Concentration Ratios, i.e. activity 
concentration in organism divided by the activity concentration in water for the main organism categories. A 
comparison was thereafter made with the values underpinning the ERICA database as presented in Hosseini et 
al. (2008). Examples of these data are presented in Table 1. The data from this study constitute an important 
additional source of material to the data already collated from earlier review. It appears that some of the values 
in the underpinning ERICA databases may need revision following this work. For example, freshwater CRs 
for 210Po in the GAPRAD study appear to be somewhat higher for benthic fish and somewhat lower for 
bivalve mollusc than those contained within the ERICA databases. 
 
Table 1 Concentration ratios (fresh weight) for freshwater biota (whole organism) from two different studies. 
 CR 210Po CR 210Pb 
Organism GAPRAD ERICA GAPRAD ERICA 
Benthic fish 630 - 9250 240 16 - 340 300 
Bivalve mollusc 1740 38000 ± 49000 530 1400 
 
210Po and 210Pb in small mammals and other fauna 
Samples collected during the field work in Dovrefjell, Central Norway, were dried, pulverised and 
homogenised prior to gamma spectrometric analyses. Following this preliminary sample preparation and 
gamma analyses, small (whole body including hair) mammal samples were dried at 70°, powdered and 
analysed at RISØ national laboratories. All other terrestrial samples, i.e. soil, plant, lichen, earthworm and 
wild bird, were analysed at Lund University Hospital (Sweden). Samples were subsequently corrected for 
ingrowth from Pb-210. 
By way of example, activity concentrations varied from 39 – 85 Bq kg-1 d.w. 210Po for bank vole (n = 8) and 
20 – 83 Bq kg-1 d.w. 210Po for the common shrew (n = 9). Higher concentrations of 210Po were found in bank 
vole compared to common shrew (Mann-Whitney U-test, Z = -2.50,  p = 0.011). It appears that the primarily 
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herbivorous bank vole is accumulating higher concentrations of these natural radionuclides compared to the 
insectivorous shrew. The 210Po activity concentrations for the whole body of the bank vole and shrew are 
similar in magnitude to activity concentrations determined for the muscle of reindeer, sampled at a site <100 
km distant at Vågå in Norway. At this location activity concentrations of 36 Bq kg-1 d.w. in female reindeer 
muscle and several hundred Bq kg-1 d.w. in liver were determined (Skuterud et al., 2005). These activity 
concentrations are considerably higher than the levels reported in Beresford et al. (2007), where an activity 
concentration of 0.09 Bq kg-1 f.w. was reported for a category consigned the title “All mammals” and 
comprising of 32 assorted samples. Whether this discrepancy reflects the preliminary nature of the results 
presented in this paper, differences (physiology, diet, habitat) between the mammals considered in the 
aforementioned study and the present study, differences in what is being measured i.e. muscle versus whole 
body etc., or differences in deposition of 210Pb between the study areas remains a subject for further 
investigation. 
 
Polonium in man 
Within the framework of GAPRAD a study was set up to establish radiobiological parameters, important in 
dosimetry, such as fractional uptake parameter gastrointestinal absorption factors f1 and biological retention 
times of radioisotopes Po-209 and Po-210 in the body. Gastrointestinal absorption factors have been 
established in earlier studies with a wide range of results. For example, the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection has increased their reported GI factor from 10% (1979) to 50% (1993), which 
according to other studies seems too small.  
In the first part of the study one person was given 50 mBq of 209Po with an oral intake frequency of 24 hours. 
The goal of this part was to remain the intake frequency until constant radioactive output from urine and feces 
was maintained, i.e. equilibrium of intake and excretion. 24h urine samples were collected a few times every 
month until 320 days from the first intake. Then the intake of 209Po and urine sampling stopped and 24h faeces 
sampling for a week was initiated. The results showed clearly a slow decreasing excretion of 209Po in faeces in 
the range 0.59 - 0.07 % of consumed activity. Urine samples analysis showed a fluctuating value of 209Po 
excretion with a maximum peak value of about 1 % (ca 17.5 mBq/L) 40 days from the first intake. The next 
step of the project was to distribute an acute oral intake to two persons of 10 Bq and then study the immediate 
body burden response by spectrometric analysis of urine and feces. In the acute oral intake study, the 
maximum daily excretion rates in faeces of 18 - 50 % can be measured three days after intake. Urine activity 
excretion measures an average of 0.15 - 1 % of ingested activity after two days from intake. 
These results indicate a GI factor of 0.50 - 0.75, and correlates well with earlier biokinetic studies of polonium 
in man.  
 
References 
Beresford, N.A., Barnett, C.L., Jones, D.G., Wood, M.D., Appleton, J.D., Breward, N., Copplestone D. 
(2008b). Background exposure rates of terrestrial wildlife in England and Wales. Journal of Environmental 
Radioactivity, Volume 99, Issue 9, September 2008, Pages 1430-1439.  
Brown, J. (Ed.) (2009). Knowledge gaps in relation to radionuclide levels and transfer to wild plants and 
animals, in the context of environmental impact assessments, and a strategy to fill them. NKS-Report NKS-
182; ISBN 978-87-7893-248-8; pp. 28. 
Gjelsvik, R. & Brown, J. (Eds.) (2009). Po-210 and other radionuclides in terrestrial and freshwater 
environments. NKS-181; ISBN 978-87-7893-247-1, pp. 41. 
Hosseini, A., Thørring, H., Brown, J.E., Saxén, R., Ilus, E. (2008). Transfer of radionuclides in aquatic 
ecosystems - Default concentration ratios for aquatic biota in the Erica Tool. Journal of Environmental 
Radioactivity 99, 1408-1429.
Larsson, C-M (2008). An overview of the ERICA Integrated Approach to the assessment and management of 
environmental risks from ionising contaminants. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 99 (9), pp. 1364-
1370. 
Skuterud, L., Gwynn, J. P., Gaare, E. Steinnes, E. & Hove. K. (2005). 90Sr, 210Po and 210Pb in lichen and 
reindeer in Norway. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 84, 441-456. 
 
The final NKS report for the NKS-B GAPRAD activity is available here. 
 24
NKS-R NROI: Radiolytic oxidation of iodine in containment conditions 
Joachim Holm 
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden 
joachim.holm@cjalmers.se
 
Introduction 
Iodine is a volatile and hazardous fission product that can be released during a severe accident, therefore it 
causes great concern in safety analyses. The behaviour of iodine during a severe accident has been studied in 
several experimental programs, ranging from the large-scale PHEBUS FP tests and intermediate-scale ThAI 
tests to smaller studies. The existing knowledge of the behaviour of iodine needs to be extended, especially in 
the areas of interactions of gaseous iodine with air radiolysis products in the containment atmosphere. There 
have been a few experimental studies of the effect of radiation on gaseous inorganic iodine chemistry, among 
others the early work by Vikis [1, 2]. The authors focussed on studying the reaction of I2 with O3, as the 
resulting conversion of gaseous iodine to solid iodine oxide aerosols has the potential to allow radioactive 
iodine to be removed from the containment atmosphere by filtration. The reaction product was I4O9 at 
temperatures up to 100°C, but this decomposed to I2O5 and I2 at higher temperatures. It is also possible that in 
the reaction between iodine and ozone the product is I2O4 [3, 4, 5, 6]. When I2O4 is heated up to 135-190 °C it 
decomposes to I2O5 and I2 [7, 8].  
The aim of this project was to determine the influence of oxygen, ozone and iodine concentration as well as 
that of radiation intensity on the possible formation of iodine oxide aerosols from elemental iodine gas. The 
speciation of the formed iodine particles was also considered to be investigated. 
 
Elemental iodine oxidation experiments 
The experimental set-up can be seen in the presentation of the NROI project at the NKS summary seminary 
(09.03.26-09.03.27). The tube line of the experimental set-up was made of stainless steel with Sulfinert® 
coating of the inner surfaces. The Sulfinert® coating reduces the retention of iodine to the lines and that kind 
of coating is widely used in many gas chromatography applications.  
Gaseous iodine was produced in a separate flask at the inlet of the facility. The procedure was to add drops of 
H2SO4 from a dropping funnel into the iodine solution. A carrier gas line was connected to the flask. The flow 
passed through a glass needle and the produced iodine gas, I2(g), was swept out.  
The gas mixture was transported to a UV furnace, which consisted of a tube of fused silica, a thermocouple for 
heating twirled around the silica tube and an insulating box of stainless steel. Inside the furnace, four 
ultraviolet lights were located with short wave length radiation (c-type). The UV light ionises the gas flow and 
while oxygen is within the flow it is expected to react with radiation to form ozone. An ozone generator was 
also used to produce ozone from air or oxygen gas. The temperature in the UV furnace was fixed at 120 °C.  
The gas mixture was transported to the sampling furnace, where the temperature was fixed at 120 °C to 
prevent condensation of water inside the tubes. The tube inside the sampling furnace was divided into three 
main lines. One line was for analyses of the formed aerosols, which were measured with Scanning Mobility 
Particle Sizer (SMPS) and a CPC device. Those two devices were on-line and measured the particle size 
distribution and the particle concentration, respectively. Aerosol particles were also collected with a suction 
sampler, developed at VTT, on copper or carbon grids. The grids were analysed with Scanning Electron 
Microscope (SEM) and in some cases with Transmission Electron Microscope (TEM). With SEM/TEM it was 
possible to analyse the morphology of particles. In order to achieve information about the speciation of 
particles, energy dispersive X-ray (EDX) analysis was used. 
The second line in the sampling furnace was used for analysing the gas phase composition, which was 
performed on-line with a Fourier Infrared (FTIR) device. This device was mainly used for measurements of 
the ozone concentration, but also for measurements of possible gas species formed due to presence of the UV 
radiation field.  Unfortunately, FTIR is not able to measure homonuclear bimolecules (such as I2). 
 Further, the third line consisted of an integral filter and three analytical sampling lines and was located 
downstream in the sampling furnace. The integral filter was used to filter aerosols before the gas flow was 
transported to a fume hood. The analytical lines consisted of one paper filter and two bubbling bottles in 
series. It was possible to use each analytical line separately, so data from three different conditions were 
received per each experiment. The liquid used in the bubbling bottles was a 0.05 M sodium hydroxide 
solution. After the experiments the filters were transferred directly into a bottle with 0.05 M NaOH solution, 
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for dissolution of the iodine aerosols. All samples, both the filter and the bubbling bottle solutions, were 
analysed with ICP-MS (Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy). 
 
Experimental procedure 
 Eight experiments were done, with three different conditions in each experiment giving 24 experiments in 
total. The atmosphere in the system was either air or nitrogen with oxygen. The volume fraction of oxygen in 
a gas flow was 50%, 21% or 2%. The experiments were conducted with dry or moist gas. The moisture in the 
gas flow came from the iodine production reaction. While the concentrations of oxygen, ozone, iodine and 
humidity were varied, it was possible to measure the effect of these parameters on the amount of reaction 
products. 
In the experiments the total gas flow through the flow furnace ranged from 6 l/min to 24 l/min (NTP). The 
total flow rate was varied in order to study the effect of residence time on iodine reaction products.  
Experiments were conducted with varying ozone to iodine molar fraction by changing the ozone generator 
production power. Also, the UVC lights were not used in every experiment and the power of the UVC 
radiation was varied in order to study the effect on gaseous and aerosol products.  
 
Results 
The results of the experiments are presented in Table 1. The first two columns present iodine masses collected 
in aerosol filters and gas bubblers. Based on this data the fraction of iodine transported as aerosol particles and 
as gas is calculated. Total gaseous iodine concentration fed into the system is determined by summing the 
filter measurements and the bubbler measurements and is presented in the table in ppm. Iodine concentration 
can thus be directly compared with the ozone concentration measured with the FTIR device. It should be 
noted though that the total iodine concentration is underestimated, because retention in the facility could not 
be taken into account. The last column presents the residence time of the flow inside the facility. 
When aerosol and gaseous fractions of iodine are compared, it can be seen that iodine is transported either 
almost completely as aerosols or almost completely as gas. Some exceptions among the experiments can be 
seen, 2B, 2C, 4C and 7B. In these experiments are ozone and iodine is present in the system, so an extensive 
particle formation should be expected. But complete particle formation (defined as more than 85% of the 
iodine in solid form), did not occurred in these experiments. In the experiment 4C, the residence time was so 
low that the time for complete iodine condensation on the particles was too short. In experiment 7C, the 
incomplete particle formation probably depends on both short residence time and low ozone concentration. It 
is more difficult to explain the behaviour in experiments 2B and 2C, but the incomplete particle formation 
probably depends on problems with the particle trapping on the filters. 
 
Nucleated aerosol particles 
During the experiments it was observed that the formation of aerosol particles was almost instant, when iodine 
feed was on and the ozone production was started. It seemed that even low ozone concentrations were able to 
produce very large concentrations of particles (~106-8/cm3). 
 
Aerosol size distribution properties 
According to measured aerosol number size distributions the primary particles, formed in the reaction of 
iodine and ozone, were very small. The diameter of the smallest particles measured was less than 10 nm. The 
number median diameter of particles ranged from 60 - 120 nm depending on initial iodine concentration, 
ozone concentration and residence time within the facility. Particle growth took place primarily by 
agglomeration, then the particle size increased and their number concentration decreased with increasing 
residence time 
The effect of initial iodine concentration on the size of the formed particles was also investigated. Increasing 
iodine concentration led to increasing number median diameter and decreasing number concentration of 
particles. This is another proof of agglomeration growth as fast nucleation rate and initially high particle 
number concentration would lead to much higher agglomeration growth rate. On the other hand, substantially 
increased size of the smallest particles with high iodine concentration also indicates particle growth by 
reaction of iodine on particle surfaces. This would be a secondary growth mechanism in the experiments. 
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Table 1: The mass and concentrations of oxygen, ozone and iodine in the experiments are presented. There is calculated 
residence time (t) of the flow inside the facility. UVC lights were on in seven experiments. 
Exp. O2 
[%] 
I2 in aerosols 
[mg] 
I2 in gas 
[mg] 
Aer. of total 
I2 [%] 
Gas of total 
I2 [%] 
O3 
[ppm] 
I2 
[ppm] 
t    
[s] 
UVC
1A 50 0.004 44.0 0.01 99.99 0 93 6.8 - 
1C 50 1.6 0.003 99.81 0.19 16 3.5 6.8 - 
2A 50 - - - - 200 NA 6.8 - 
2B 50 0.005 0.006 44.08 55.92 350 0.02 6.8 - 
2C 50 0.008 0.05 15.39 84.61 43 0.11 6.8 - 
2D 50 0.03 0.0005 98.17 1.83 414 0.06 6.8 ON 
3A 21 - - - - 0.36 NA 6.8 ON 
3B 21 0.006 0.04 15.09 84.91 0.34 0.09* 6.8 ON 
3C 21 0.002 0.04 4.87 95.13 0.31 0.09* 6.8 ON 
3D 21 0.02 0.2 11.52 88.48 0 0.45* 6.8 - 
4A 21 0.4 0.001 99.65 0.35 140 0.87 6.8 - 
4B 21 0.2 0.0004 99.79 0.21 130 0.36 3.4 - 
4C 21 0.2 0.1 69.46 30.54 130 0.75 1.7 - 
5A 21 2.6 0.0008 99.97 0.03 242 5.6 6.8 - 
5B 21 2.1 0.0007 99.97 0.03 130 4.4 6.8 - 
5C 21 - - - - 132 NA 3.4 - 
5D 21 0.03 5.8 0.50 99.50 0 12.5 6.8 - 
6A 2 0.5 0.0003 99.94 0.06 110 1.2 6.8 - 
6B 2 0.5 0.003 99.47 0.53 103 1.2 6.8 - 
6C 2 0.4 0.005 98.82 1.18 20 0.86 6.8 - 
7A 2 - - - - 87 NA 6.8 - 
7B 2 0.2 0.1 58.26 41.74 8.9 0.59 3.4 - 
7C 2 0.1 0.001 99.25 0.75 103 0.31 3.4 - 
8A 2 0.0002 0.008 2.35 97.65 0.03 0.02 6.8 ON 
8B 2 0.00004 1.1 0.004 99.996 0.04 2.4 6.8 ON 
8C 2 0.00007 2.3 0.003 99.997 0.04 4.9 3.4 ON 
*   The measurement accuracy was not good, because of the low ozone concentration. 
** The column of FTIR or the volume of the facility was not completely free of ozone, even though ozone was not fed 
into the facility. 
 
SEM/TEM analyses 
The analysis of particles with SEM and TEM was difficult. Particles seemed to evaporate and melt when 
focused under the electron beam. However, it was found that particles contained iodine and oxygen. 
According to the literature, there are three probable iodine oxide species what to expect, I2O4, I2O5 and I4O9.  
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Introduction 
Swedish and Finnish boiling water reactor (BWR) plants employ cavity flooding as a severe accident 
management (SAM) strategy to secure containment integrity in case of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) failure 
and melt ejection into the cavity. It is assumed that melt will fragment and form a coolable by natural 
circulation porous debris bed on the containment concrete basemat. However pouring of hot melt in to a 
subcooled water pool introduces the risk of energetic steam explosion while debris bed coolability is 
contingent upon many factors and is not necessarily a settled case. The ultimate goal of the present research 
program at KTH is to help resolve the long-standing severe accident (SA) issues (i.e., ex-vessel steam 
explosion and debris coolability). The research is driven by hypotheses that (i) melt discharge from the BWR 
vessel is gradual, in dripping mode that largely eliminates the steam explosion risk and facilitates formation 
high-porosity, easy coolable debris beds, (ii) non-eutectic binary melts render low energetics steam 
explosions. The technical focus of the work is development of experimental and analytical methods for 
addressing multiscale nature of SA phenomena and reduction of epistemic uncertainty. 
 
In-Vessel Coolability 
The main sources of uncertainty for the ex-vessel stage of SA are possibility of in-vessel retention, vessel 
failure mode and melt characteristics upon discharge. To address the uncertainty the In-Vessel Coolability 
(INCO) research project was initiated at Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). The goal of the study is 
development of accident analysis models for prediction thermo-mechanical interactions between corium melt 
pool and vessel wall in different scenarios. The focus of the research is on assessment of in-vessel melt 
retention feasibility in case of control rod guide tube (CRGT) cooling as SAM measure. The challenge for the 
BWR in-vessel coolability study is accurate resolution of local heat transfer phenomena and their effect on the 
vessel failure mod. Direct simulation of melt pool heat transfer is rather impractical due to very complex 
geometry of reactor lower head with hundreds of penetrations. Therefore effective, computationally affordable 
models the Effective Convectivity Model (ECM), the Phase-change ECM (PECM) for internally heated 
volume, and metal layer ECM/PECM [1,2,3] which preserve information about local distribution of heat 
fluxes, and can take into account real geometry of BWR lover head, were proposed developed and validated in 
the framework of the INCO project. An approach to efficient use of the CFD method for development of 
efficient models is proposed. The validated CFD method is used to perform heat transfer simulations in 
specific unit-volume geometries of BWR lower plenum, to get the insights into the flow and heat transfer 
physics and to produce necessary data for validation of the effective models. Validation of the effective 
models for accident analysis is performed against existing experimental and CFD generated data. Results of 
validation show that predicted results are well fitted in 10% margin of experimental (and CFD-generated) 
data, although the further quantification of uncertainty is necessary. 
The ECM, PECM, and metal layer ECM/PECM were applied to heat transfer simulation of different BWR 
accident scenarios in real geometry of BWR lower plenum. In the Figure 1a a melt pool in the slice segment of 
the BWR lower plenum is shown. It is assumed that the CRGTs are cooled by water flowing inside them. 
Results of simulation show that the debris bed formed in the BWR lower plenum is heated up and remelted, 
forming a melt pool. For the debris bed less than 0.7m deep, the CRGT cooling is capable to keep the vessel 
wall temperature well below the thermal creep limit, assumed to be 1100 C (Figure 1b). However, in case of 
1 m deep pool there is a region which is far from cooled CRGTs and the vessel may fail in several hours 
(Figure 1b). 
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Figure 1a. Melt pool configuration in the BWR lower plenum (t = 6.1 h, red color-liquid; blue-solid). Figure 1b. 
Evolution of vessel wall maximum temperature for different melt pool depths. 
 
Ex-vessel Coolability 
The goal of the ex-vessel coolability study is reduction of epistemic uncertainty in the debris bed formation 
and coolability phenomena. The work has two directions correspondently: Debris Bed Formation (DEFOR) 
and Porous Media Coolability (POMECO). The goal of the DEFOR research program is to study mechanisms 
that govern debris bed formation and creation of knowledge and database needed for the assessment of 
coolability of debris beds formed in prototypic reactor accident scenarios. Both experimental [4] and 
analytical [5, 6] approaches are used in the investigation to reveal how microscopic phenomena at the scale of 
single particle affect macro parameters such as averaged porosity [5] and agglomeration [6]. 
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Figure 2a. DEFOR facility. Figure 2b. Dependency of the debris bed porosity on water subcooling. 
 
The DEFOR experimental facility for performing of test on pouring of high melting temperature, binary 
oxidic melt simulant materials into a water pool is shown in the Figure 2a. The results of DEFOR-S 
experiments [4] show that porosity of a bed comprised of fragmented debris, is high (~60-70% Figure 2b), 
compared to the traditionally assumed value of 40%. Debris agglomeration and cake formation were also 
observed, contingent upon the pool’s depth, water subcooling and melt superheat [4]. Size distribution and 
morphology of the debris fragments (including surface roughness, sharp edge, internal porosity) are brought 
together to show their trends as function of melt materials and water subcooling. The DEFOR-S experiments 
provide the first systematic database on fragment morphology and debris formation. While the bed’s 
“macroscopic” porosity (60-70%) is potentially coolability-friendly, there remain large uncertainties in 
“microscopic” factors, such as the internal porosity, particle and pore size distribution, particle morphology 
and surface roughness, debris agglomeration. These factors may be counteractive with respect to two-phase 
flow permeability and passability in the bed’s porous media. Understanding and characterization of both the 
prototypic debris bed’s microscopic characteristics and their impact on corium coolability are subjects of the 
continued study in the DEFOR and POMECO programs with an increasing emphasis on analytical modeling 
and simulation. 
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Figure 3. POMECO-FL Facility 
 
For assessment of debris bed coolability, a semi-analytical model was developed, validated and used to 
investigate Natural-Circulation-Driven-Coolability (NCDC) of debris beds. Bottom-feeding, bed’s 
inhomogeneity, and potential effect of bed characteristics found in DEFOR experiments on coolability 
indicated that there is substantial coolability margins, compared to the previous assessments based on models 
and experiments using a top-flooding, homogeneous bed with assumed porosity of approximately 40%. The 
heating with electric heaters embedded in a debris bed used in different experiments was predicted to reduce 
the dryout heat flux, in comparison with a uniformly and volumetrically heated bed. 
To improve fidelity of coolability analysis, the PEMECO-FL test facility (Figure 3) is designed to investigate 
friction laws in i) a bed packed with debris simulant (e.g., sand particles); and ii) the debris beds formed from 
FCI tests (e.g., DEFOR) – which have both multi-size and irregular shape particles (including, hollow 
particles). The PEMECO-HT facility will be used to determine the dryout heat flux of debris bed packed by 
sand particles with the similar size distribution as in the existing FCI tests (e.g., FARO) and debris bed packed 
by particulate debris formed in DEFOR tests. 
 
Steam Explosion Energetics 
Molten Fuel-Coolant Interactions (MFCI) which occurs in a nuclear power plant during a hypothetical severe 
accident may result in energetic vapor explosions and challenge the structural integrity of the plant reactor 
pressure vessel and containment. In the last decades, much work has been done with the purpose of 
developing a better understanding on the thermo-hydraulic processes that govern the vapor explosions. More 
recently, in large scale corium experiments with eutectic and non-eutectic material, it was observed that the 
eutectic corium exploded spontaneously whereas the non-eutectic corium was shown to be resilient to an 
energetic interaction even when triggered. Although substantial evidences indicate an actual material effect on 
the resulting energetics, the relationship between the molten material type and its triggability remains unclear. 
On the other hand, such large scale experiments provide an integrated picture of all phases of the explosion. It 
is the authors’ believe that the key for the understanding of vapor explosion is in the micro-interaction level, 
specifically, the mixing of volatile coolant into the hot melt, which is responsible for the local pressure 
increase that drives the escalation and propagation phases. 
Dynamics of the hot liquid (melt) droplet and the volatile liquid (coolant) are investigated in the MISTEE 
(Micro-Interactions in Steam Explosion Experiments) facility by performing well-controlled, externally 
triggered, single-droplet experiments, using a high-speed visualization system with synchronized digital 
cinematography and continuous X-ray radiography, called SHARP (Simultaneous High-speed Acquisition of 
X-ray Radiography and Photography) (Figure 4) [7]. Analysis of the data obtained by the SHARP system and 
image processing procedure developed provide new insights into the physics of the vapor explosion 
phenomena, as well as, quantitative information of the associated dynamic micro-interactions [8, 9]. The 
acquired images followed by further analysis led to a hypothesis about a novel phenomenon called pre-
conditioning, according to which dynamics of the first bubble-dynamics cycle and the ability of a triggered 
melt drop to deform/prefragment (Figure 4) dictate subsequent explosivity of the droplet [8]. Implications of 
the governing role of the melt preconditioning will be explored further on the effort to elucidate the evident 
effect of melt materials on vapor explosion energetics. 
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Figure 4. SHARP system and Phenomenology of droplet explosion with emphasis on the melt preconditioning. 
 
Summary 
Experimental and simulation tools developed in the framework of the research program at KTH help to reduce 
epistemic uncertainty in multiscale multiphase phenomena in Nordic BWR severe accidents. The future steps 
will be focused on application of developed and validated simulation tools to systematic study of plant scale 
phenomena and search for limiting physical mechanisms which can reduce the influence of aleatory 
uncertainty in SA scenarios. 
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Introduction 
In order to assess short- and long term consequences of radioactive contamination in the environment, 
information on the source term including the distribution of physico-chemical forms (speciation), 
transformation processes occurring after release and deposition as well as the kinetics involved is needed. 
Such information can be obtained by means of speciation analysis of radionuclides. Determination of the total 
concentration of the element alone is not sufficient and may lead to erroneous conclusions. Speciation analysis 
is necessary for the evaluation of the risks of pollutants in the environment, the bioavailability of elements in 
soils or plants and the transport mechanisms of metals to the human body.  
In general, the risk perspective has driven the major part of research conducted on the behaviour of natural 
radioisotopes as well as anthropogenic radioisotopes in the environment. This has been a natural consequence 
of the nuclear weapons programme and the development of nuclear power for civil use. It should however be 
kept in mind that for decades radioisotopes have been used for environmental tracer purposes. Radioisotopes 
have been used in large-scale systems such as determination of gas-exchange rates between the atmosphere 
and the oceans or quantification of world ocean circulation but also in microscopic events such as colloid 
aggregation and exchange interaction between molecules. Regardless of purpose, knowledge on the behaviour 
of the different radioisotopes is a key issue whether it serves to determine the possible pathways to human 
exposure or if it serves as a potential tracer for some process.  
A NKS project entitled on “speciation analysis of radionuclides in environment (SPECIATION)” is being 
carried out since January 2007. This project aims at (1) overview of the research activity on speciation of 
radionuclides in Nordic countries, and establish a close collaboration among Nordic laboratories for speciation 
of radionuclides; (2) Further development and improvement of analytical methods for speciation of some 
important radionuclides in the environment, such as Pu, Am, Np, and 129I, (3) Investigation of speciation of the 
some radionuclides in specific Nordic environments, such as the plutonium contamination in Thule, 
Greenland, issues related to Nordic repositories for nuclear waste and the behaviour in Nordic waters of 
radionuclides from European reprocessing facilities. (4) Intercomparison on the speciation of Pu, U, Th, 
137Cs, and 129I in soil and sediment samples within Nordic labs. In this article, some results under this 
project are presented.  
 
Further development on the method for speciation analysis of 129I seawater samples  
A simple method for the separation of iodide and iodate from water by co-precipitation of AgI with AgCl was 
developed. For separation of iodide-129, iodide carrier (1-2mg) is first added to the seawater (0.1-2 liters), and 
pH is adjusted to 5-7 using HCl, and then 0.2-2 ml of 1mol/L AgNO3 is added (Cl:Ag >10 mol/mol), the 
solution is stirred for 30 min. and the precipitate is separated by centrifuge. 25% of NH3 is then added to the 
precipitate to dissolve the AgCl, and the separated AgI is is directly used for AMS analysis of iodide-129. For 
total I-129, after addition of iodine carrier and HCl to pH<2, NaHSO3 solution is added to reduce iodate to 
iodide, then total iodine is separated by the same procedure as for iodide. The iodate-129 is calculated by the 
difference between iodide-129 and total iodine-129. The analytical results showed that the recovery of iodine 
is more than 80% and the crossover of iodate in the iodide fraction is less than 2%. Because more samples can 
be treated simultaneously (>10 sample /h), the method is rapid and very suitable for the in situ separation on 
board. 
 
Speciation method for 129I and 127I in air  
A method for the collection and separation of different species of iodine in air was further developed. In this 
method, particle associated iodine, inorganic gaseous iodine and organic gaseous iodine was collected by 
pumping the air through air sampler with sequential air filters as show in Fig. 1. In which the particle 
associated iodine was first collected on a glass fibre filter with pore size of 0.45 μm, the gas components 
passed through the filter. Inorganic gaseous iodine, such as I2, HI, HIO are then trapped by cellulous filter 
which was impregnated in NaOH/glycerol and dried. Finally the organic gaseous iodine, mainly alkane iodide, 
such as CH3I and CH3CH2I was trapped in a column filled with active charcoal which was impregnated with 
TEDA.  The collected different species of iodine were then separated by a combustion method (Fig.4). In this 
method, the collected sample was put into a quartz boat, and 125I as yield tracer was added to the sample. The 
sample boat was then put in a quart tube which was heated by a tube oven while compressed air and oxygen 
gas were passed through the tube during heating. The iodine released during heating up to 800 °C was then 
trapped by two set of bubbler filled with 0.2 mol/l NaOH solution. One ml of tapped solution was taken for 
the determination of 127I by ICP-MS. The remained solution was used for the separation of iodine and AMS 
determination of 129I by solvent extraction method and AgI precipitation method as the same as for water 
sample.  
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Figure 1. Air sampler for the collecting particle associated 
iodine, inorganic gas iodine and organic gas iodine. 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the dynamic sequential 
extraction systems. 
 
Dynamic system for fractionation of Pu and Am in soil and sediment  
A dynamic extraction system exploiting sequential injection (SI) for sequential extractions incorporating a 
specially designed extraction column was developed to fractionate radionuclides such as Pu, Am, Np and 
137Cs in environmental solid samples such as soils and sediments (Figure 2). The extraction column can 
contain a large amount of soil sample (up to 5 g), and under optimal operational conditions it does not give 
rise to creation of back pressure. The purpose of developing such a dynamic system for fractionation of 
radionuclides is to reduce the re-adsorption problems during sequential extraction using a modified Standards, 
Measurements and Testing (SM&T) scheme with 4-step sequential extractions. In addition, the dynamic 
system is more similar as the situation occurring in nature. 
 
Speciation of 129I in precipitation collected in Roskilde, Denmark 2001-2006 
Speciation analysis of 129I and 127I in precipitations collected from Roskilde, Denmark in 2001 to 2006 was 
completed, the variation of concentrations of iodide, iodate, total iodine for 129I and 127I are shown in Figure 3. 
The concentrations of total 129I in precipitation vary from 0.28 to 5.63 × 109 atoms L-1 with an average of (2.34 
±1.43) × 109 atoms L-1, and the annual deposition flux of 129I is (1.25 ±0.30) × 1012 atoms m-2. Iodide is the 
major species of 129I, which accounts for 50-99% of total 129I with an average of 92%. The concentrations of 
total 127I vary from 0.78 to 2.70 ng mL-1 with an average of 1.63 ±0.47 ng mL-1, and annual deposition of 127I 
is 0.95 ±0.26 mg m-2. Unlike 129I, iodate is the major species of 127I, which accounts for 43-93% of total 127I 
with an average of 68%, and the concentrations of non-ionic iodine and iodate are lower. The 129I/127I atomic 
values for total iodine vary from 5.04 to 76.5 × 10-8 atom/atom with an average of (30.1 ±16.8) × 10-8, while 
these values are 10 times lower for iodate with an average of (2.95 ±3.13) × 10-8. A similar seasonal variation 
of 129I/127I values as well as 129I concentration are observed with higher values in spring and lower ones in the 
summer-autumn period. 
 
129I and 127I and their speciation in lake sediment  
In the aim of capturing both the historical changes in 129I deposition since the start of the nuclear era and 
understand possible occurrence modes of iodine, we have measured 127I and 129I in a sequence of lake 
sediment located in central Sweden. The varve structure together with a well-defined 137Cs Chernobyl peak 
provided constrained chronology of the sediment, which covers the period 1942-2006 (Figure 4). All samples 
were measured for 129I and 9 selected samples were used for the sequential leaching procedure and 
measurement of 129I and 127I in four fractions of each sample. 
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Figure 3. Variation of concentrations of 129I-, 129IO3-, and total 
inorganic 129I in precipitation from Roskilde, Denmark in 2001-
2006 (the error bar shows the analytical uncertainty). 
Figure 4. Depth profile of 129I concentrations for 
total iodine and different species of 129I in a lake 
sediment in central Sweden. 
 
Sequential extraction of Pu in soil, sediment and concrete samples  
The developed dynamic extraction method has been used to investigate the fractionation of Pu in soil collected 
from Thule, Greenland and heavy contamination area near Chernobyl power plant, sediment samples collected 
from Thule, Greenland, Palomares, Spain and Irish Sea, and concrete samples from the concrete shielding in 
Danish DK-2 research reactor which was decommissioned. The result (Table 1) shows that most of Pu was 
associated to organic and oxides fractions and small fraction of Pu exists as mobile or bioavailable form 
(exchangeable and carbonate) in soil and sediment. However, in the concrete sample, a large fraction of Pu 
exists in a mobile form (carbonate), very less associated to the organic fraction. To our best knowledge, this is 
the first investigation of the Pu fractionation in concrete, the results are very important with regard to waste 
disposal. 
 
Table 1 Sequential fractionation of 239,240Pu (Bq/kg) in soil, sediment, and concrete samples using dynamic sequential 
extraction system. 
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Conclusion and perspective 
Through this project, a good collaboration was established in the Nordic labs, and a number of analytical 
methods were developed for the speciation analysis of radionuclides. The developed methods have been 
successfully used for the investigation of the environmental behaviours of radionuclides. A number of 
significant investigations have been completed, they are summarized below: 
1) The speciation of Pu isotopes in radioactive concrete from the decommissioning of Danish nuclear reactor 
DK2 was observed to be very different with those in environmental samples such as soil and sediment, Pu in 
the concrete is more mobile than that in soil and sediment. 
2) Speciation analysis of Pu isotopes in the soil and sediment from the contaminated area in Thule Greenland 
shows that Pu is less mobile in these samples, and therefore less bioavailable. 
3) 129I speciation was successfully applied to investigate the dispersion of pollution in the North Sea, Kattegat, 
and Baltic Sea, as well as for the investigation of marine geochemical cycle of stable iodine by use of the 
different species of 129I and 127I. 
4) 129I in the precipitation in Denmark dominates by iodide, while the dominant species of 127I is iodate, it 
indicates that 129I and 127I have a different source. 
5) 129I is mainly associated to organic phase in the sediment and soil, which is not mobile. Speciation of 
radionuclides is becoming more and more attractive and important  topic. However, the speciation is much 
more complicated when comparing to the total concentration of radionuclides. 
Although much work has been done during this project, many questions remain to be answered and many 
applications remain to be investigated. 
 
 
 
The final NKS report for the NKS-B SPECIATION activity is available here. 
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Introduction 
Radioactive particles represent a significant fraction of the refractory (i.e. non-volatile) radionuclides released 
during nuclear events (Salbu, 2000). Following their release, radioactive particles represent point sources of 
short- and long-term radioecological significance, and the failure to recognise their presence may lead to 
significant errors in the short- and long-term radiological assessment of the impact of radioactive 
contamination at a particular site. The present work provides an overview of sources reported to have 
contributed to radioactive particle contamination in the Nordic environment or in areas of relevance to the 
Nordic countries and the characteristics of observed particles. 
Fallout from more than 2300 atmospheric (Fig. 2-1), surface, underground and underwater nuclear weapon 
tests and sub-critical safety trials with conventional explosives are the major sources of radioactive 
contamination in the environment (UNSCEAR, 1993; UNSCEAR, 2000). Of these, the 543 atmospheric 
nuclear weapon tests are by far the most important contributor (UNSCEAR, 1993; UNSCEAR, 2000). 
Authorized or accidental releases from the nuclear fuel and nuclear weapon cycles, especially reprocessing 
plants and nuclear reactors, also contribute significantly. Releases from satellite, aircraft and submarine 
accidents and dumping of radioactive waste at sea have a local impact only. 
 
Radioactive particles from nuclear tests 
Nuclear weapons tests have been conducted at various locations, on ground and in underground tunnels, 
mounted on towers, placed on barges on the ocean surface, from balloons, dropped from airplanes, and high-
altitude launchings by rockets. Depending on the location of the explosion (altitude and latitude) the 
radioactive debris entered the local, regional, or global environment (UNSCEAR, 1993). According to Heft 
(1970), all the radionuclides (except 3H, 14C and the long lived rare gases) involved in a nuclear detonation are 
accounted for completely as radioactive particles. In the Nordic countries, air monitoring programmes have 
revealed transport of radioactive particles from nuclear tests, for example from tests at Novaya Zemlya 
(Sisefsky, 1961) and at Lop Nor (Persson and Sisefsky, 1969). Investigations of air filters collected during 
1958-1962 have demonstrated the presence of hot spots that are attributed to fallout particles (Wendel et al, 
unpublished) 
 
Reprocessing and Nuclear waste sites 
Siberian Nuclear sites 
Nuclear weapon materials were produced at three main sites in the former Soviet Union: Mayak PA 
(Chelyabinsk-45 or 65), Krasnoyarsk Mining and Chemical Industrial Complex (Krasnoyarsk-26), and 
Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7). Relatively large routine releases occurred during the early years of 
operation of these facilities (UNSCEAR, 1993). In addition, accidents have contributed to radioactive 
contamination in the vicinity of the sites. A few reports on radioactive particle contamination in the vicinity of 
Tomsk-7, Krasnoyarsk-26 and Mayak exist (Bolsunovsky and Tcherkezian, 2001; Joint Norwegian-Russian 
expert group for investigation of radioactive contamination in the Northern areas, 2004; Sukhorukov et al., 
2004; Tcherkezian et al., 1995). Although these sites are located several thousand km from the Kara Sea, 
remobilisation of radionuclides from particles will occur over time and the subsequent river transport into the 
Arctic Ocean needs to be included in impact assessments. 
 
Dumping of nuclear waste in the Russian Arctic: Kola Bay (STUK) 
In the Kola Bay, NW Russia, two types of radioactive particles have been identified in marine sediment and in 
lichen samples collected in the vicinity of nuclear fuel storage and radioactive waste sites (Pöllänen et al., 
2001). The particles were identified by means of gamma-ray spectrometry and autoradiography, separated and 
subjected to various analysis techniques. 137Cs was present in the sediment matrix in large (~ 100 μm) 
greenish particles that were most probably pieces of paint. Although their element composition was 
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heterogeneous, 137Cs was found to be evenly distributed. 60Co in the lichen matrix was present in small (~ 1 
μm) particles. Neither U nor transuranium elements were identified in either type of particle. 
 
Dumping of nuclear waste in the Russian Arctic: Novaya Zemlya and the Kara Sea 
During 1959-1991, radioactive waste including 6 reactors with fuel, 10 reactors without fuel, vessels, barges 
and more than 6 000 containers were dumped in the Abrosimov, Stepovogo and Tsivolky bays and in the Kara 
Sea Trough (AMAP, 1997). Furthermore, the fuel assembly from the Lenin reactor, assumed dumped along 
the east coast of Novaya Zemlya, has not yet been localised (AMAP, 1997). In the close vicinities of dumped 
objects, especially containers, enhanced levels of Pu-isotopes and fission products in sediments were 
observed. Close to the hull of a submarine, Eu-isotopes were also identified. Based on autoradiography, 
heterogeneities in the sediment samples reflected the presence of particles, and strong oxidising solutions 
(H2O2 in HNO3) were needed to leach the Pu-isotopes from the sediments. Crud particles containing 60Co were 
also identified using SEM (Salbu et al., 1997). 
No reports on the existence of radioactive particles in Niteelva sediments (repository for historical releases 
from Institue of Energy Technique, Kjeller, Norway) or at the spent fuel site at Andreyeva Bay appear to have 
been published in the open literature. 
 
Nuclear accidents 
Although most nuclear accidents have had a local impact only, some events (fires, explosions, re-entry of 
satellites) have resulted in global or regional contamination. When nuclear accidents occur and refractory 
radionuclides are released, the presence of fuel particles should be expected (Salbu, 2000). Nuclear reactors 
with their considerable inventories of radioactive material are potential sources of environmental 
contamination. Several incidents and some accidents have occurred, and radioactive particle are known to 
have influenced the Nordic region during two occations; notably the fire at Windscale piles (Salbu et al., 
1994) as well as the explosion and subsequent fire at Chernobyl (Victorova and Garger, 1990). 
One of the fuel channels of the RBMK reactor Unit 3 in Sosnovyy Bor, near St. Petersburg, Russia, broke 
down on 23-24 March 1992. Small amounts of noble gases, iodine and particulate radioactive materials were 
released and transported towards Finland (Toivonen et al., 1992) and radioactive particles were subsequently 
identified in air filter? samples (Paatero and Hatakka, 1997; Pöllänen, 1997). 
Since the beginning of the nuclear age there have been numerous accidents involving nuclear weapons. In 
January 1968 a B52 plane from the US strategic Air Command caught fire and crashed on the sea ice in Bylot 
Sound about 12 km west of the Thule Air Base, Northwest Greenland. Fissile material, i.e. U and Pu, from 
four weapons was dispersed over ice in a distance of a few kilometres, mainly as hot particles. It has been 
estimated that the inventory of 239+240Pu is somewhere between 1 and 10 TBq (Eriksson, 2002), i.e. 
significantly higher than estimated prior to mid 1990s. The particles contain significant amounts of enriched U 
in addition to Pu and these elements coexist throughout the particles (Eriksson et al., 2005) as a mixture of 
oxides of U and Pu, although not homogeneously mixed (Lind et al., 2007). 
 
Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (TENORM) 
Radioactive particles are not exclusively of anthropogenic origin. For example, small grains of Th-bearing and 
U-bearing minerals, which occur naturally in soil and sediments, may also be considered as radioactive 
particles (Entwistle et al., 2003). Moreover, Th, U and daughter nuclides such as 210Po/210Pb (Landa et al., 
1994) may be heterogeneously distributed in minerals, thus occurring as hot spots in U mining and tailing 
sites. Recently, single grains of U minerals have been isolated from soil samples originating from former U 
mining sites in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Lind et al., 2008). Apparently, no reports on radioative 
TENORM particles identified in the Nordic countries are to be found in the open literature, However, in 
ESEM-XRMA, heterogeneities (i.e. U hot spots) have been observed on surfaces of Norwegian mineral 
specimens (Salbu et al., unpublished). 
 
Conclusion 
The present overview report shows that there are many existing and potential sources of radioactive particle 
contamination of relevance to the Nordic countries. Following their release, radioactive particles represent 
point sources of short- and long-term radioecological significance. The failure to recognise their presence may 
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lead to significant underestimation of the inventory (partictial leaching prior to analysis) and errors in the 
short- and long-term impact assessments related to ecosystems affected by particle contamination. Thus, there 
is a need of knowledge with respect to the probability, quantity and impact of radioactive particle formation 
and release in case of specified potential nuclear events (e.g. reactor accident or nuclear terrorism). 
Furthermore, knowledge with respect to the particle characteristics influencing transport, ecosystem transfer 
and biological effects is important. In this respect, it should be noted that an IAEA coordinated research 
project (CRP) was running from 2000-2006 (IAEA CRP, 2001) focussing on characterisation and 
environmental impact of radioactive particles, while a new IAEA CRP focussing on the biological effects of 
radioactive particles is under planning. 
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Introduction 
Future climate scenarios show not only possible changes in the mean state but also changes in weather 
extremes. Together with a pronounced warming over Europe there is a tendency that weather extremes may 
become more intense and/or more frequent in the future (Beniston et al., 2005). Intensified extreme weather 
events may prevent normal power operation and simultaneously endanger safe shutdown of nuclear power 
plants. Extreme weather events could influence, for example, the external power grid connection, emergency 
diesel generators (blockage of air intakes), ventilation and cooling of electric and electronics equipment rooms 
and the cooling water intake. In the joint project Climate risks and nuclear power plants (WERISK) the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute and the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute investigate 
changes in temperature extremes, both as observed for the 20th century and as simulated by climate models for 
the 21st century. Here we present changes, simulated by a regional climate model, in annual maximum and 
minimum temperature extremes over Scandinavia for the 21st century. 
 
Data and method 
For downscaling of Global Climate Model (GCM) scenarios over Scandinavia we use the Rossby Center 
Regional Climate Model (RCA3) (Kjellström et al., 2005) with a horizontal resolution of 0.44° 
(approximately 50 km). The RCA3 is driven by boundary conditions from three simulations with the 
ECHAM5/MPI-OM global model (Roeckner et al., 2006). All three use the same A1B emission scenario 
(Nakićenović et al., 2000) but the different initial conditions in 1860. There are two reasons for utilising 
several ensemble members; i) an ensemble samples a part of the natural variability in the climate and ii) the 
number of data increases significantly. 
The estimated probabilities of annual maximum or minimum temperature at the 2 meter level are expressed in 
terms of 50-year return values. The 50-year return value is defined as the threshold that is exceeded once 
every 50 years. Or, in other words, the threshold that is exceeded any given year with the probability 1/50. In 
order to take into account the possible non-stationary nature of extremes in transient simulations we use a 
moving window approach. The parameters of the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution are estimated 
by applying the 21-year moving window and pooling three members of the ECHAM5-driven ensemble into 
one sample gives the total sample size 63 for each 21-year window. The 50-year return values are then 
estimated by inverting the GEV cumulative distribution function. 
 
Results 
The simulated 50-year return levels of annual maximum and minimum temperature for the reference 1970-
1990 period are presented in Figs. 1a and 2a. We should note that for this period the model substantially 
underestimates maximum temperature and overestimates minimum temperature with a bias 5-8°C (not 
shown). The bias is mainly due to inadequacies in cloud water and radiation fluxes in the model (Kjellström et 
al., 2005).The simulated changes in maximum temperature extremes show the largest increase in the 50-year 
return level over southern Sweden and south-western Finland. By the end of this century the increase is 3-6 °C 
(Fig. 1f). Closer in time, as for the 2010-2030 period (Fig. 1c), the increase in the 50-year return level of 
maximum annual temperature is in most of Sweden and in southern Finland 0-2 °C. 
In case of minimum temperatures the spatial distribution is different (Fig. 2). As the simulated warming is 
larger in the north also the largest change in the 50-year return levels of daily minimum temperature can be 
found in parts of northern Sweden and Finland by the end of this century (Fig. 2f). The change may exceed 10 
degrees. This means that very cold temperatures would become much more rare in Lapland. Also in other 
areas the change in the annual lowest temperatures is predicted to be larger than in the case of annual highest 
temperatures. These results are consistent with previously reported results for means and extremes in this area 
(Kjellström et al., 2007). 
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Figure 1. a) The simulated 50-year return level of annual maximum temperature at the 2-meter level for the 1970-1990 
period and its A1B scenario change for five subsequent periods: b) 1990-2010, c) 2010-2030, d) 2030-2050, e) 2050-
2070 and f) 2070-2090. 
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Figure 2, The same as Fig. 1 but for annual minimum temperature 
 
Finally we note that the presented results for future extremes are based on just a few simulations with climate 
models. We are aware that such a small set of experiments only sample a small part of the uncertainty related 
to climate change. In particular, the three ensemble members do sample some of the uncertainties related to 
natural variability. A larger ensemble that also sample uncertainties related to emissions (different emission 
scenarios) and choice of boundary conditions (different GCMs) would be preferable. Some results of that kind 
have been obtained within the European PRUDENCE and ENSEMBLES projects (e.g. Beniston et al., 2007). 
Also, other RCMs should be used in such a context as much of the uncertainties in the extremes and higher 
order variability is related to the choice of RCMs (Kjellström et al., 2007). 
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Introduction and background 
Leakages and ruptures of piping components lead to reduction of loss of the pressure retaining capability of 
the system, and contribute to the risk of nuclear power plants. In-service inspections (ISI) aim at verifying that 
defects are not present in components of pressure boundaries or, if there are defects, ensuring that these are 
detected before they affect the safe operation of the plant. 
Reliability estimates of piping (and other structural components) are needed e.g. in PSA studies, risk-informed 
ISI applications, and other structural reliability assessments. The reliability of piping components is affected 
by ISI, since inspection results increase the knowledge of the state of the inspected components.  
Risk-informed in-service inspections (ISI) aim at optimising the inspection programme by taking into account 
the plant risk analysis results and directing inspections to the risk-significant locations. This will result in a 
better allocation of resources, in proportion to their importance for safety. Finland and Sweden are leading 
European countries in using extensively risk-informed methodologies, and the applications risk-informed ISI 
approaches are very topical in both countries. 
When moving from a deterministic ISI programme to a risk-informed ISI, the impact of the ISI programme 
changes on risk is evaluated. One important contributor in the risk evaluation is the inspection reliability, since 
the risk reduction through inspection is directly related to the inspection reliability. The quantification of the 
risk impact calls for the use of quantitative measures for failure consequences and probabilities. 
One approach to quantify the piping failure probabilities is the use of probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) 
models. These models can account for the ISI effectiveness and interval, and allow sensitivity studies. A 
detailed modelling of ISI effectiveness is difficult, since it depends on several factors, and it would be very 
expensive to produce statistical data to estimate the probability of detection (POD) for various flaws. On the 
other hand, one could question the need of very detailed POD estimates in RI-ISI applications. If sufficient 
risk reduction can be shown by using simplified (conservative) POD estimates, more complex PODs are not 
needed. 
 
Objectives of the study and expected results 
The purpose of the study is to investigate reasonable and practical requirements that should be set for 
assumptions about the accuracy of how inspection reliability is quantified in terms of probability of detection 
(POD) curves, especially from a RI-ISI point of view. Another objective of the study is to benchmark Nordic 
approaches to quantify piping failure probabilities with probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) approaches. 
 
The project consists of following phases:  
1) Definition of a set of cases to be analysed 
• The cases should represent piping welds under varying loading and environmental conditions, and 
susceptible for various degradation mechanisms. Further a set of probability of detection (POD) 
functions will be defined. 
2) Analyses of selected cases 
• Application of probabilistic fracture mechanics methods and tools to analyse selected piping weld  
cases with various POD assumptions 
• Sensitivity studies 
3) Comparison of results 
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• Evaluation of the impact of various assumptions on the results, conclusions on the benchmarking of 
the PFM tools and on the effect of POD assumptions on risk reduction 
4) Reporting in a NKS report 
 
The results can be utilised in application and evaluation of quantitative RI-ISI analyses, and the benchmarking 
can provide added confidence on the modelling approaches. The results of the POD analyses may justify the 
use of rather simple POD curve assumptions in RI-ISI. Such simplified POD curves would be much easier to 
derive and justify e.g. from the inspection qualification process than more complex functions. The study can 
also help to clarify what level of POD needs to be proven at qualification of an inspection procedure. In some 
cases the results might justify relaxation of the required inspection capability and qualification. 
 
Status of the project 
Three cases have been selected to be analysed, and input data for probabilistic fracture mechanics calculations 
have been defined. Table 1 shows the piping system and dimensions of the analysed piping welds. 
 
Table 1. Analysed cases 
Case identifier System Pipe diameter (mm) Wall thickness (mm) 
BWR1 Recirculation piping system 114 8 
BWR2 Shutdown cooling system 324 25 
PWR3 Primary loop 872 65 
 
Following input parameters have been collected and agreed upon among the project group: 
• Pipe and defect geometries: pipe dimensions, defect depth and length distributions 
• Loadings: internal pressure and temperature, membrane stress, primary and secondary global bending 
loads, residual stresses, design limiting stress 
• Material data: yield stress, ultimate tensile stress, fracture toughness, crack growth law parameters, 
Young’s modulus, Poisson’s ratio 
For each of the analysed welds, three POD functions were determined. The most detailed POF function was 
taken from SKI report 3/2005 [1]. This is referred in the following as “full POD”. Two simplified, 
conservative step functions were based on following assumptions: 
1) Detection limit 2 mm, i.e. flaws below 2 mm are not detected. Probability of detection for flaws above 
2 mm is constant, corresponding to the detection probability of 2 mm flaws of the “full POD” (=0.65). 
2) Detection limit 80% of the wall thickness, smaller flaws are not detected. Probability of detection for 
flaws above 80% of the wall thickness is constant, corresponding to the detection probability 
determined by “full POD” at 80% of wall thickness. 
The background for the step functions is following: 2 mm is a typical detection limit requirement for the NDE 
system. The value 80% of wall thickness is a maximum allowable crack size. Figure 1 illustrates the POD 
functions used in Case PWR3. 
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Figure 1. POD functions for Case PWR3. Black solid line is the “full POD” according to [1], green solid line is the Step1 
POD (detection limit 2 mm) and the blue dashed line is the Step2 POD (detection limit 80% of wall thickness). 
 
For each POD case, it was assumed that the inspections take place at 6 years intervals. In addition to analysing 
the crack growth under these POD assumptions, calculations were also run assuming that the welds are not 
inspected. All calculations were run for 60 year plant lifetime. 
Some preliminary calculations have been performed by Inspecta and VTT. The analyses need still to be 
verified, and thus the results presented here may not be final. 
In table 2 we show the risk reductions due to inspections for the three different POD assumptions for Case 
PWR3. The percentages indicate how many percent the cumulative failure probability at the end of the 
lifetime is decreased due to the inspections. Note that this accumulates the effect of all inspections (totally 10 
inspections in 60 years). 
 
Table 2. 
 Analysis tool 1 Analysis tool 2 
“full POD” 99% 99.9% 
Step1 POD (step at 2 mm) 94% 98% 
Step2 POD (step at 0,8t) 25% 17% 
 
It is clear that highest risk reduction is obtained with the “full POD” assumption. The Step1 POD results also 
in a very high risk reduction, although the POD level is only 0,65. In the case of the Step2 POD, achieved risk 
reduction is small. This indicates that if a crack has grown close to the maximum allowable crack size, it is 
likely that it can grow through the wall in shorter time than the inspection cycle, and thus is not captured by an 
inspection. 
The results depend on the growth characteristics of a flaw, which in turn depends on the material properties, 
loadings and other environmental conditions. 
The project is going on, and further analyses and sensitivity studies will be run and reported in the final report. 
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Introduction 
The objective of the NordRisk (2005-6) and NordRisk II (2008-9) projects has been to find practical means for 
assessing the risks due to long-range atmospheric dispersion of radioactive materials. Within the first of these 
projects two different assessment tools were developed: 1) an atlas over different atmospheric dispersion and 
deposition scenarios based on numerical weather prediction model data, and 2) a PC-based software tool 
providing an analytical model for the climatological mean dispersion and deposition of radionuclides. While 
the atlas provides a simplified risk assessment tool using historical data, the software allows the user to alter 
parameter values describing the release and meteorology and can therefore be used for assessment of the risks 
from e.g. other release sites, accident scenarios, and meteorological conditions. 
The NordRisk II project will further develop these tools taking into account the detailed topography and 
climatology relevant to the Nordic region. The atlas will be extended to cover more release sites in and near 
the Nordic countries. A thorough statistical analysis of the long-range dispersion and deposition patterns will 
be performed aiming at quantifying both the mean dispersion and deposition and the variability associated 
with long-range atmospheric transport and deposition. Hence, the expected outcome of NordRisk II will be a 
simplified probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tool in which the (default) parameters needed to describe the 
probability density functions are derived from the statistical analysis of the atmospheric dispersion model data. 
The potential end-users are foremost the Nordic emergency management authorities; the authorities participate 
in the project along with Nordic research institutions (Table 1). The two assessment tools developed through 
the project are primarily intended for emergency preparedness planning purposes, but even for ongoing 
accidents the tools may be used for rapid assessment of the scale of the radioactive contamination. Hence, the 
atlas and the software tool are intended to be used as a supplement to decision support systems currently 
applied in Nordic nuclear emergency preparedness. In NordRisk II the underlying data will be made available 
in a format which is compatible with the ARGOS decision support system. 
Table 1. NordRisk projects participants  
NordRisk and NordRisk II Risø DTU National Laboratory Denmark 
 Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI) 
 Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) 
 Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) 
NordRisk II Danish Emergency Management Agency 
 Geislavarnir Rikisins 
 
The Risk Atlas 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for atmospheric dispersion addresses the possible transport and deposition of 
radioactive material released from a given risk site. Such assessments may readily be carried out for short-
range atmospheric dispersion from a nuclear installation using numerical weather prediction model data 
coupled to a local atmospheric dispersion and deposition model. Even for long-range atmospheric transport on 
a European scale, such calculations have been made possible in recent years with the increase in computing 
power. In the NordRisk projects calculations are carried out with the purpose of developing an atlas of long-
range atmospheric dispersion scenarios. The atlas is based on archived numerical weather prediction (NWP) 
model data coupled to the Danish atmospheric dispersion model DERMA and contains case studies of 
hypothetical releases from nuclear installations in the Northern Hemisphere (ERA-40, Sørensen et al., 2007). 
The results of these long-term, long-range atmospheric transport and deposition calculations are presented in a 
risk atlas as a series of maps showing time-integrated air concentration and total deposition fields (Fig. 1). The 
atlas applies both to accidental (short-term) releases of radionuclides and to continuous emission of 
radionuclides or other contaminants from a given risk site. In both cases, the atlas maps the “ensemble mean” 
concentration fields. For accidental releases, combined with a release risk assessment or an indication of the 
magnitude of the actual release the maps provide a first assessment of the mean-value of the radioactive 
contamination. For continuous emissions of radionuclides or other contaminants from a risk site, the atlas 
directly provides the expected geographical scale of contamination. 
Both for the short-term and the long-term release conditions, large fluctuations due to the stochastic nature of 
atmospheric transport and deposition are to be expected compared to the ensemble mean-values. The 
dispersion model calculations, in addition to the mean concentration fields, provides information on the 
variability both in the case of a continuous release and based on (accidental) short-term releases (Fig. 2). In 
combination with the ensemble-mean value, the assessed variability constitutes a probabilistic risk assessment 
of atmospheric transport of radionuclides under similar meteorological conditions as used for the atlas. 
The atlas describes different release sites and radionuclides. A general trend for the long-term averaged 
deposition or air concentration fields is the tendency towards pattern of a near-isotropic ensemble-mean 
deposition. Fluctuations around the mean value are in most cases well described by a gamma model 
distribution. 
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Figure 1. Deposition of 137Cs from two one-year continuous release from Kola NPP. 
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Figure 2. Probability density function of the relative deposition density, based on 24-hour releases. The solid line is a 
gamma model distribution with shape parameter 1/ 0.025φ = . 
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Risk Assessment 
The software tool developed in the NordRisk project is based on a simple model for the ensemble mean 
deposition fields. The basic assumption is here that the ensemble mean long-range atmospheric dispersion and 
deposition can be modelled as a pure advection-diffusion process with constant diffusivity and deposition 
parameters (Lauritzen and Mikkelsen, 1999). The model can be solved analytically and its resulting fields 
coded for graphical presentation. While the model does not account for the complexity associated with real-
time dispersion model calculations, the simplified model does provide a fairly good approximation to the 
gross deposition patterns associated with the ensemble-mean dispersion and deposition (Lauritzen et al., 
2006). 
The model contains only a small number of parameters, which depend both on the meteorological conditions 
and on the physical-chemical properties of the dispersed material. The parameter values must be set 
externally, either from model assumptions, e.g. from regression against numerical dispersion model 
calculations such as those employed for the NordRisk atlas, or from expert judgments.  
In the context of nuclear emergency management the analytical model is only useful to the extent that suitable 
parameters for an accident situation can readily be found.  A main objective of the NordRisk II project is 
therefore both to perform comprehensive numerical calculations of long-term, long-range atmospheric 
dispersion and deposition specific to the Nordic region and to perform a thorough statistical analysis of the 
resulting deposition patterns. The aim of the statistical analysis is to identify the general trends of the 
ensemble mean and the variability of long-range atmospheric transport and to derive default parameters 
describing the resulting deposition and air concentration fields.  
When coupled with assumed release profiles of radioactive material from North European sites this will 
constitute a probabilistic risk assessment tool based on historical NWP model data. With default parameters 
for the long-range atmospheric transport of radionuclides the simplified model will allow for a rapid 
assessment of risks from sites and for accident release scenarios for which detailed, long-term numerical 
atmospheric dispersion model calculations have not already been carried out.  
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The final NKS report for the NKS-B NORDRISK activity is available here. 
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Introduction 
The NKS-B PardNor activity addresses current shortcomings in modelling of ingestion doses for Nordic 
decision support.  Nordic preparedness authorities apply in principle either the ARGOS or the RODOS 
decision support system for consequence prognoses and optimisation of countermeasure strategies.  In both of 
these systems, the integrated ingestion dose module is identical with the ECOSYS model developed in 
Germany shortly after the Chernobyl accident (Müller & Pröhl, 1993).  A problem in this context is that 
practically all generic parameterisation in ECOSYS took place many years ago and does not reflect state-of-
the-art knowledge.  Also, the ECOSYS model was parameterised for Bavarian conditions, and with respect to 
a range of input factors, it is clear that location specific information is required to obtain reliable dose 
estimates.  Nevertheless, the model is generally still run in RODOS and ARGOS with its Bavarian default 
parameters. 
 
Methods 
Parameter studies are conducted to improve the foundation for Nordic ingestion dose modelling, and the 
effects of the findings are recorded through application in an Excel version of the ECOSYS model supplied by 
its originators. 
The following work tasks have been identified as potentially important, and are carried out in the process 
towards establishing trustworthy Nordic decision support systems: 
1. Analyses of typical diets in different Nordic countries 
2. Analyses of Nordic import fractions of food products 
3. Analyses of animal feeding regimes in the Nordic countries 
4. Analyses of seasonal leaf area development in the Nordic countries 
5. Better estimates of leaching rates, fixation rates, desorption rates, and resuspension enrichment factors 
for contaminants in soil 
6. Definition of transfer factors in relation to soil classification 
7. Improvement of animal metabolism parameters (transfer factors and biological half-lives) 
8. Improvement of deposition velocity estimates on crops and open fields, according to particle size 
9. Improvement of natural weathering rates (e.g., according to precipitation, time-dependence) 
Of these nine work tasks, the top five have been carried out, the following two are being addressed in the 
current activity period, and the last two will be addressed in the final activity period next year. 
 
Results and discussion 
The following shows some examples of PardNor activity results in relation to the first and fifth of the above 
work tasks. 
 
 
Nordic diets 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the consumption of wheat and rye flour in the Nordic countries, based on 
national dietary surveys (Nielsen & Andersson, 2008).  Here it is seen that a typical Danish adult consumes 
more than 3 times as much rye flour as the typical Norwegian adult.  Such traditional differences in diet can be 
very important to take into account in optimising efforts to reduce doses after a contaminating incident.  
However, as this relationship is 4.3 for the senior adults, but only 2.9 for teenagers, this particular difference 
between Norwegian and Danish diets seems to be declining, stressing the need for recent dietary data for the 
modelling.  Fairly recent dietary data is available for most Nordic countries.  The exception is the Faroe 
Islands, where the latest, and not very detailed dietary survey seems to have been conducted in 1981-82. 
Anyway, in the Faroe Islands and Iceland, these grain products are imported from abroad.  It is also seen from 
Figure 1 that due to differences in climate, in the northernmost countries (Norway and Finland), practically all 
wheat used for consumption by humans is spring wheat, whereas in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, the 
majority of the wheat produced/consumed is winter wheat.  This means that if a contamination occurs in the 
spring, the wheat plants will in Finland and Norway have undergone very little development, whereas in the 
more southern countries, where sowing took place already in the previous autumn, and the warmer weather 
would lead to a more rapid plant development, the wheat plants could be quite mature, and receive a 
comparatively considerably larger contaminant deposition.  This would greatly affect wheat flour 
contamination levels in the first year harvest. 
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Figure 1. Consumption of wheat and rye flour in the Nordic countries, and German ECOSYS defaults, D (averages for 
adults). 
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Figure 2. Consumption of beef and milk in the Nordic countries, and German ECOSYS defaults, D (averages for adults). 
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Figure 2 shows a comparison between the average consumption by adults of beef and milk in the different 
Nordic countries (and ECOSYS defaults).  Here there are differences by a factor of 4-5 between some of the 
countries.  It should also here be noted that the best Faroese data available are several decades old.  As the 
Chernobyl accident demonstrated, the rapid milk food chain may be of very high importance in connection 
with a contaminating incident.  The fact that very young German children consume some 3 times less milk 
than Nordic children of the same age group again demonstrates the importance of applying location specific 
input data for the ECOSYS model, as ECOSYS defaults are for some products clearly unsuited. 
 
Contaminant fixation rates in soil  
In ECOSYS, fixation rates govern the loss of bioavailability of the contaminants due to strong attachment of 
radionuclides particularly to clay minerals.  Fixation half-lives are generally (with the exception of caesium 
and strontium) by default set to very high values (mostly 1000 years), to reflect the low tendency of fixation in 
soil of most radionuclides considered in ECOSYS.  This is reasonable, and even estimates of doses received 
over as long a period as a life-time would not be affected by refining these parameter estimates.  Specifically 
for caesium, the selective fixation in clay minerals gives a much shorter fixation half-life.  Here, the ECOSYS 
default value is 8.7 years.  Like other ECOSYS parameters, this is based on old assessments, not taking into 
account the many assessments made after the Chernobyl accident, in which physicochemical forms of the 
contaminants are representative of those that may be expected in connection with a future large nuclear power 
plant accident.   
Applying a modified version of the sequential extraction technique described by Tessier, it was suggested by 
Oughton et al. (1990) that the ‘strongly fixed’ fraction of a contaminant in soil could be defined as the part of 
the contamination that can not be extracted with the most inert solutions, but requires addition of strong acid 
to go into solution.  Such modified Tessier extractions have also been applied by other workers, and it has 
become a standard technique for sequential extractions to assess the mobility in soil and sediments of 
contaminants like 137Cs and 90Sr.  If it is assumed that the mobile (easily extractable) fraction decreases 
exponentially over time, sequential extractions carried out by various workers at different times after the 
contamination from the Chernobyl accident took place on soil samples from Nordic, Ukrainian, Russian and 
other European areas with different characteristics (see Nielsen & Andersson, 2009, for references), suggest 
that radiocaesium fixation half-lives would typically range between about 1.3 and 2.7 years for most soils with 
significant mineral phases, and some 4-5 years for very sandy or organic soils. 
If the fixation half-life for caesium is changed from 8.7 years to 2 years, in an example scenario where dry 
deposition of 137Cs occurs on the 1st of January, and diets, import fractions and animal feeding regimes reflect 
Danish conditions (as defined by PardNor activity), whereas the rest of the parameters are ECOSYS defaults, 
ECOSYS would estimate the influence on ingestion dose components as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Percentage change in ingestion dose contributions to adults integrated over respectively 2 and 50 years, by 
setting the 137Cs fixation half-life to 2 years (scenario described above). 
 Winter wheat flour Fruits Cow’s milk Beef (cow) Total 
2 years 18.5% 23.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
50 years 67.6% 69.9% 7.7% 8.0% 9.5% 
 
The figures in Table 1 show that particularly some of the long term dose contribution estimates could be far 
off if a fixation half-life value of 8.7 years is used for a mineral soil.  It is also worth noting that this change in 
fixation half-life changes the estimate of the total ingestion dose received over the period from 10 to 20 years 
after the deposition by a factor of about 200.  Such a difference in estimates could be highly important in 
connection with decision support to lift long-term restrictions and return an area to more normal living 
conditions. 
The data for sequential extractions of strontium is sparser, but investigations by Oughton et al. (1990), 
Oughton et al. (1992) and Salbu et al. (1994) suggest a fixation half-life of respectively 20 years, 11 years and 
23 years for soils with mineral content.  This is in good agreement with the default fixation half-life of 20 
years applied in the ECOSYS model. 
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Introduction 
The interest of safety aspects of wire systems aging (especially those wire systems used for control and 
instrumentation) is increasing worldwide because of their impact on several industrial fields, like power 
generation, transportation and defense. Although the environment conditions and degradation mechanisms of 
installed cables can be different from target to target, the negative consequences of wire failures, both from a 
safety and performance standpoint, are so important that almost all the countries in the industrialized world 
have some research project in progress in this area. 
In the nuclear field, where cables are normally qualified before installation for an expected life of 40 years, 
there are a number of issues that are not completely solved today. These issues include: 
• The effect of the particular adverse environment conditions (high radiation, humidity and temperature), 
especially during and after a Design Basis Accident (DBA). 
• Extending the plant life after 40 years involves the requirement to assess and qualify the cable conditions 
for a longer time. 
• Many cables condition monitoring techniques do exist today, but none of them is considered accurate and 
reliable enough for all the cable materials in use and conditions. In addition to that, only few of them are 
non-destructive techniques and are applicable in situ. 
• Accelerated aging techniques, for qualification purposes under DBA conditions, are often not conservative 
and should be complemented with reliable condition monitoring methods. 
A workshop on Wire System Ageing Assessment and Condition Monitoring was organized by the Halden 
Project at Zurzach, Switzerland, the 28-29 October 2004. This meeting was a good basis for the planning of 
the activities to be performed on this topic. 
In 2005, the WASCO project has been focusing the development of a technique based on high frequency 
reflectometry and the development of a prototype software to test this technique. During 2005 the following 2 
tests have been designed and performed: 
• Norsk Hydro tests on long cables 
• EPRI tests on thermally aged nuclear plant cables 
A final report [5] was written and published with the achieved results 
In 2006 the system was further developed and on-site tests at Barseback and Ringhals NPPs were performed 
and analyzed, as reported in the project final report [6]. 
 
Objective of the 2008 WASCO project 
The main objective of the 2008 project is to evaluate and compare the capability of few popular CM 
techniques in the assessment of cable aging and failure as a consequence of thermal aging and mechanical 
damage. In particular, the detection and assessment of local hot spots, due to local higher environment 
temperature, will be evaluated. The techniques that will be tested in this experiment are: 
• Elongation-At-Break (EAB). It will be used as a reference method to correlate the 3 other techniques to the 
widely accepted 50% absolute EAB as limiting value.  
• The Indenter. It is a local mechanical test that is in use in several power plants. The Indenter has always 
shown a good correlation with EPR, EPDM and PVC insulation types, but less confidence with XLPE 
types. 
• TDR and LIRA. Both these methods are based on electrical properties of the insulation. TDR is a time 
domain method used for many years to detect anomalies along electrical wires, while LIRA is supposed to 
be a more sophisticated and sensitive method that monitors cable impedance variations to detect and 
localise cable defects or degradations. 
Comparison Results between TDR and LIRA 
TDR Measurements 
It is difficult to extract conclusions with the results obtained from TDR tests. Figure 1 shows the results 
obtained with the thermal spots on 4 samples.  Although some reflections are visible in all the traces, the spots 
at 10m are not easy to identify. 
 
 
Figure 1. TDR representation of TXL cables 
 
LIRA Measurements 
The hot spots in the 4 aged samples were all clearly visible in LIRA. Figure 2 shows the signature for one of 
them (TXL1) . The shape of the spikes indicates that the size of this spot is close to 1.5m (the size at which the 
two spot ends start to be detected with a double peak) and the spot position is accurately detected. The large 
spike at 30m is the termination reflection. 
 
 
Figure 2. TXL1 spot in View Mode (LIRA) 
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Mechanical Faults Test 
Two types of mechanical damage were tested:  TXM1 had a cut down to the insulation of 2 conductors, while 
TMX2 a gouge over 2 cm of length, see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 TXM2 gouge of 2 wires (dry) 
 
TDR Measurements 
Figure 4 shows the traces for TXM1 and TXM2. Although some possible features are visible in the damaged 
areas, no clear diagnosis can be assessed. 
 
Figure 4. TDR trace for TXM1 and TXM2 
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LIRA Measurements 
Figure 5 shows TXM1 before (red trace) and after the mechanical damage at 10m. The spot feature is clearly 
visible at the right position. 
 
Figure 5 TXM1 cut at 10m(dry) 
 
Conclusions 
The experiment performed at Tecnatom showed the performance and limitations of current condition 
monitoring tools for cable aging. Among the emerging techniques, LIRA confirmed its good performance in 
hot spot detection and localization. 
This project showed also that more research is needed in this field, primarily to develop a stable indicator of 
the global aging condition of a cable in harsh environment. 
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Introduction 
The in-core power distribution is one of the most important parameters calculated in the design and the 
operation of nuclear reactors, because it is the basis for estimating other requisite parameters, e.g., the 
probability of the failure of fuel elements, including their claddings both in the normal operations and in the 
accident situations. 
Presently, the in-core power distribution is calculated by an approximation method (the neutron diffusion 
theory), because available computing power has not been sufficient to use rigorous method of the neutron 
transport theory [1]. A margin for the error caused by the approximation is thus necessary in operating nuclear 
reactors e.g., to secure the integrity of fuel elements. It is obvious that reducing the margin for such an error 
by improving the accuracy of the calculation will contribute to improve the safety of nuclear reactor 
operations. 
The performance of a PC, on the other hand, has been improving and, recently, has become so high that there 
is a possibility of solving the rigorous neutron transport equations with a normal PC. 
With these backgrounds, a method (VNEM: Variational Nodal Expansion Method) of calculating the in-core 
power distribution by solving the rigorous neutron transport equations has been developed, and verified by 
numerical benchmark problems [2]. As shown in the reference [2], the results were excellent and the next stage 
should be the verification by the comparison to the real plant data, where inter-Nordic cooperation seems 
necessary. 
In the year 2008, as the 1st part of the verification work of VNEM, comparisons have been made of VNEM 
prototype system to the measured data obtained from Ringhals unit 3 NPP at its beginning of life, hot-stand-by 
state [3]. Three cases with difference control rod bank positions and Boron concentrations have been compared: 
 
• Case 1: nearly all rod banks withdrawn, Boron = 1315 ppm 
• Case 2: bank C = nearly half-inserted, bank D = fully inserted, Boron = 1131 ppm 
• Case 3: banks C and D = fully inserted, Boron = 1060 ppm 
 
The results can be summarized as: 
 Error: maximum detector reading (%) Error: keff (%) 
Case 1 -2.1 -0.175 
Case 2  1.5 -0.022 
Case 3 -0.5 -0.044 
 
Excellent agreement was observed in the comparison of the neutron detector readings and the core 
eigenvalues. 
The method of core modelling and parameters used in calculation of VNEM is completely the same as the 
"PWR standard option" determined from similar comparisons of VNEM and other PWRs. No empirical, or 
any sort of adjustment was done. The computing time of the present version of the code has been measured to 
be about 10 minutes per case (1/4 core symmetry is assumed) for a modern PC with dual processors. This 
makes VNEM a practical tool for more accurate core design and even on-line core monitoring. 
 
Comparison Procedure 
The composition and the geometry of fuel / core of Ringhals-3 had been transferred from Ringhals NPP to 
IFE, Halden for 3 cases shown in the previous section. The fuel-pin-cell-homogenized 7 group macroscopic 
cross sections are calculated by HELIOS [4] lattice code with ENDFB-6 library. The measured readings of the 
traversing neutron fission chambers are also transferred.  
As HELIOS is designed to provide the assembly-homogenized cross sections to the conventional nodal 
diffusion methods, we have to run a small computer code VCOEF3D to calculate parameters (called VNEM 
coefficients) needed in VNEM calculation. The VNEM coefficients are derived from the PL-transport theory 
and variational principle (Ritz method) to minimize the errors caused by the assembly-homogenization in a 
manner described in the reference [3] for all the fuel types included in the core. 
The VNEM3D code solves the nodal PL transport equations in whole core region and calculates the core 
power distribution and the core eigenvalue (keff). 
Finally a utility code makes the comparison between the measured (from Ringhals NPP), and the calculated 
(by VNEM3D) detector readings. 
 
Comparison Results 
The most important results (the error in the maximum detector reading and the core eigenvalue) are shown in 
the 1st section of this document. Figures 1, (a) through (c) show the comparisons of core average axial 
detector readings for cases 1 through 3, respectively. The detector (fission chambers) readings are calculated 
by the fission rate of infinitely-diluted U235 in the detector thimble. The misalignment of the axial position of 
the measured readings is corrected so that the position of the dips caused by the spacer grid becomes 
reasonable. A very good agreement was obtained also in the radial distribution of the readings. Refer to the 
reference [3] for more detailed comparison results. 
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Figures 1a, b and c. Core average axial detector readings comparison; triangle: VNEM, dark square: measurement, grey 
square: error (%) 
 
Conclusions 
The agreement is excellent both for the detector readings and the core eigenvalue. The computing time is 
about 10 min. per case (1/4 core symmetry is assumed), which seems quite satisfactory for almost all the 
applications in static core analysis. 
The transport effect (the effect of including the angular distribution of neutrons) is significant, i.e., a P3 
calculation seems necessary. 
The result of a transport calculation is very sensitive to the number of neutron energy groups. The calculations 
in this verification are performed using 7 energy groups. It is very difficult to reduce the number of energy 
groups to less than 5 with reasonable accuracy maintained. 
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The aim 
The aim of GammaRate is to harmonize calibration of handheld dose rate meters used in emergency situations 
and propose guidance documents intended for emergency personnel. The guidance will be for use and 
maintenance of the dosemeters. The activity began in 2008 and is planned to last for three years. 
 
Background 
The emergency organisations are responsible for risk assessments in radiological accidents. Most of data 
collected as the basis for the assessments, is mapping of the environmental equivalent dose rates in units of 
Sv/h (sievert per hour). The values may be given with prefixes: m (1/1000), μ (1/1000 000) and n (1/1000 
000 000). 
A common understanding of the Sv, and then the risk is depending on the traceability and reliability of this 
dosimetry. The SSDLs saw a missing harmonised calibration service, and thus a missing basis for the risk 
assessments in the Nordic emergency organisations. NKS supported this understanding by granting funding to 
the GammaRate activity. 
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The figure illustrates the links between calibration of dosemeters at SSDLs and emergency organisations risk 
assessments and action decisions.  
 
The project will concentrate on the three first boxes. Guidelines are available and will be referred to. The 
experience from Nordic emergency exercises is that training in use of handheld dose rate meters is of more 
importance than new guidelines. 
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Introduction 
Despite a perceived simplicity relative to other radioanalytical techniques, the use of gamma spectrometric 
techniques in emergencies is straightforward and features a number of potential pitfalls. Many labs are 
primarily involved in the routine analysis of samples displaying a simple spectrum of natural nuclides plus 
some Chernobyl or weapons fallout nuclides. Samples measured soon after an accident are unlikely to 
resemble these in terms of spectral complexity, range of isotopes and activities. Countries without significant 
nuclear facilities may lack experience in the analysis of complex spectra which may impact upon emergency 
response capabilities. Proficiency testing and regular exercising using samples of complex isotope mixtures is 
a beneficial practice that increases competence and confidence in handling post-accident situations. 
International post-accident exercises are more complex than those for regular environmental samples. Samples 
may be drawn from a reactor and distributed to though this is neither easy to conduct in relation to transport 
nor practicable for short lived isotopes. A possible solution to the problem is the prompt measurement of such 
a sample with distribution of the spectrum to the participants. While mitigating the problem of sample 
distribution, the problem of the lack of some measure of the true value remains. A potential solution is the use 
of totally synthetic spectra which accurately represent the isotope suite and activities likely to be featured in a 
post-accident situation. Nikkinen [1] reports on the use of such spectra for the testing of emergency 
preparedness and a proficiency test employing synthetic spectra was conducted by the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) as reported in Karhu et al [2]. Two large-scale initiatives using synthetic 
spectra for gamma spectrometry quality assurance have been the US Dept. of Energy/Environmental 
Measurements Laboratory’s (EML) Gamma Spectrometry Data Validation Program [3] and the Synthetic and 
Virtual Environmental Media (SAVEM) program[4]. Within the context of the points raised in the preceding 
text, it was proposed to conduct an international exercise using a synthetic complex gamma ray spectrum in 
order to both provide an opportunity to exercise and to elaborate upon the advantages and disadvantages of 
such an approach. 
 
Methods  
Two spectra were created for REMSPEC both using the same simulation conditions (low background HPGe 
detector, 40% rel. eff.). The first was a calibration spectrum of approximately 100 Bq each of 137Cs, 133Ba and 
88Y and 1000 Bq 40K obtained from a simulated measurement period of 10 hours. The second was the actual 
test spectrum containing a suite of isotopes based upon an analysis of a hypothetical accident involving a 
nuclear power plant, as described fully by Larsen et al [5]. The test spectrum contained the following isotopes 
and activities (Table 1.). Simulation was conducted using the modified MCNP code described by Plenteda [6] 
 
Table 1. Isotopes and corresponding activities as simulated in the test spectrum. 
Isotope  Bq Isotope Bq Isotope Bq Isotope Bq 
131I 3046.50 137Cs 251.8 141Ce 66.4 131mTe 202.0 
132I 2937. 0 103Ru 297.8 143Ce 43.0 132Te 2850.0 
133I 2443.60 127Sb 218.0 91Y 376.0 131Te 45.6 
135I 217.6 140Ba 914.1 91Sr 58.9 91mY 36.9 
134Cs 321.9 140La 209.1 95Zr 80.6 135Xe 193.0 
136Cs 73.4 133Xe 27.6 95Nb 409.3   
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Simulated live time for the test spectrum was 3600 s. No dead time corrections were required, no 
laboratory/detector background was simulated as it was assumed that the short count times and normal levels 
of detector shielding would result in a negligible background signal. Signals such as the 511 keV annihilation 
peak were included. True coincidence summation effects were included for all nuclides. For 134Cs only the ß – 
decay was employed; the EC branch was not simulated due to insignificant gamma emissions. For 131mTe the 
significant IT branch results in no major gamma lines and was not simulated. Two weeks prior to the exercise, 
full efficiency data (peak and total) was disseminated along with the calibration spectrum. Participants were 
instructed to use this spectrum for energy/shape calibration and not efficiency calibration for which the 
supplied data was to be used. Upon distribution of the test spectrum, participants were informed they had 3 
hours to return such results as they could and 1 week to conduct a more thorough analysis should they so 
wish. Spectra were provided in all the major spectrum formats and some generic formats.  
 
Results and Discussion 
One laboratory, Number 8, withdrew from the exercise for technical reasons. Laboratory Number 5 returned 
results for two different analytical setups, denoted hereafter as 5a and 5b. Qualitative results are presented in 
Table 2 for the 3 hour limit.  
Table 2. Qualitative results for the participants as reported within 3 hours. Gray shading indicates a positive 
identification. 
Participant 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 9 10 11 12 
131I             
132I             
133I             
135I             
134Cs             
136Cs             
137Cs             
103Ru             
127Sb             
140Ba             
140La             
141Ce             
143Ce             
91Y             
91Sr             
95Zr             
95Nb             
131mTe             
132Te             
131Te             
91mY             
135Xe             
133Xe             
 
They indicate that the majority of participant laboratories identified the iodine isotopes of highest activity 
which constituted the dominant spectral signals. The lower activity 135I was also identified by most 
participants. The three caesium isotopes did not constitute a problem for the majority with respect to isotope 
identification. The mother daughter pairings of 140Ba/140La and 95Nb/95Zr were also correctly identified in the 
majority of cases. The above isotopes, as well as 103Ru and 141Ce, are isotopes that are often featured in either 
national and international intercomparison exercises of general gamma emitting isotopes. In this respect a 
certain degree of familiarity can be expected for all laboratories and such isotopes should present no 
significant problems of identification. For isotopes not included in the group above, it can be assumed that 
many of the participants would not have much experience analyzing for them. Sb-127 was only correctly 
identified by 4 out of 12 despite presenting a number of visible peaks, of which 3 or 4 are of reasonable 
intensities. Many participants also failed to correctly identify the low activity 143Ce which exhibits a large 
number of peaks, three of which have intensities greater than 5% and one of them, at 293.2 keV being a well 
separated singlet with an intensity of 42.8%. The other cerium isotope present in the test spectrum, 141Ce, was 
identified by approximately half of the participating laboratories. Two yttrium peaks were present in the 
spectrum, corresponding to 91Y and 91mY, the former with an activity in excess of 350 Bq and the latter with an 
activity an order of magnitude lower. These two isotopes had the least number of positive identifications of 
the entire isotope suite. Yttrium-91 has only one low-intensity gamma peak at 1204.8 keV (0.3%) while the 
metastable isotope also has a single peak at 555.6 keV although this is much stronger at 95% intensity. The 
situation for 91Y is more difficult as it’s weak peak occurs within 2 keV of a strong emission from 131mTe. 
Three tellurium isotopes were in the spectrum, 131Te, 131mTe and 132Te. The latter was identified by more than 
half of the participating laboratories while 131Te and 131mTe were only correctly identified by 3 and 4 
laboratories, respectively. First round identification of the xenon isotopes was also relatively poor, 135Xe being 
correctly identified by approximately half the participating laboratories and 133Xe by about only one third. 
Identification rates for both isotopes were improved upon slightly after the one week re-analysis period. None 
of the participants were informed as to the type of filter employed and this led to one known instance of 
identified xenon isotopes being removed from the list based upon the reasonable assumption that a normal 
filter would not have retained them. The organisers had not provided information on the filter type to cover 
two eventualities which could have led to the presence of noble gas isotopes: use of a special filter such as 
carbon impregnated filters or a paper filter and carbon cartridge in series or a situation where the technicians 
on site had actually taken the sample some hours before measurement resulting in some ingrowth. Activity 
results were of a similar pattern to qualitative result: isotopes with which participants were familiar were 
generally accurately quantified but less frequently encountered isotopes were not quantified so well. The 
majority were within 25% of the actual value and many were within 10%, margins which are probably 
acceptable for decision makers in the early phases after an accident. The most obvious feature from reported 
results is the underestimation of the activity for isotopes 132I, 134Cs, 136Cs and140La (Figure 1). The magnitude 
and consistency of participant’s underestimation indicates that coincidence correction (to which these isotopes 
are vulnerable) factors were most probably not applied. Another notable aspect of the quantitative results was 
the wide variability in the uncertainties quoted in activities even allowing for the fact that some participants 
may have reported at significance levels other than the requested 1 sigma. 
 
 
Figure 1. Quantitative results for four isotopes displaying significant coincidence summation problems. 
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Conclusions. 
In general, the use of a synthetic spectrum caused no significant problems with respect to the exercise and 
facilitated a type of exercise which is not often held due to practical problems. Comments from the 
participants included suggestions to conduct similar follow-up exercises for the same type of scenario but with 
a more challenging analysis (more corrections) or exercises to improve analysis capabilities and experience 
regarding other scenarios. It was also suggested that synthetic spectra could facilitate laboratories testing of 
such things such as the typical routines of commercial software for summation corrections or for establishing 
and assessing the necessary procedures for efficient international/laboratory assistance in emergency 
situations. 
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Introduction and background 
The paper deals with an on-going Nordic (Sweden/Finland) project dealing with probabilistic safety criteria 
for nuclear power plants. The project has relations to an on-going OECD/NEA WGRisk task on probabilistic 
safety criteria in member countries. An overview is given of some of the issues discussed in project, including 
consistency in judgement in application of safety goals, safety goals related to PSA level 2, and safety goals 
related to other man-made risks in society. 
The outcome of a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for a nuclear power plant (NPP) is a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative results. Quantitative results are typically presented as the Core Damage Frequency 
(CDF) or as the frequency of an unacceptable radioactive release, often associated with the Large Early 
Release Frequency (LERF). In order to judge the acceptability of PSA results, criteria for the interpretation of 
results and the assessment of their acceptability need to be defined.  
Target values for PSA results are in use in most countries having nuclear power plants. In some countries, the 
safety authorities define these target values or higher level safety goals. In other countries, they have been 
defined by the nuclear utilities. Ultimately, the goals are intended to define an acceptable level of risk from the 
operation of a nuclear facility. There are usually also important secondary objectives, such as providing a tool 
for identifying and ranking issues with safety impact, which includes both procedural and design related 
issues. Thus, safety goals usually have a dual function, i.e., they define an acceptable safety level, but they 
also have a wider and more general use as decision criteria.  
In most countries, the history of PSA safety goals starts in the 1980s, e.g., NUREG-0880 [1] or INSAG-3 
from the IAEA [2]. At that time, PSA models were rather limited in scope. For various reasons, including 
limitations in analysis scope and capacity problems with the computer codes used for the analysis, the level of 
detail of the PSA models was also rather limited. In addition, the focus was on level 1 PSA, i.e., on calculation 
of CDF. Furthermore, the actual use of early PSA:s was generally rather limited, even if the issue of Living 
PSA received considerable attention during the 1980s. 
During the 1990s, PSA models expanded considerably, both regarding operating states and classes of 
initiating events. The level of detail of the analyses also increased. In parallel, PSA:s were expanded to level 
2, making it possible to calculate the frequency of radioactive releases. Thus, the scope, level of detail and 
areas of use of PSA have changed considerably since the time the safety goals were originally defined. At the 
same time, there is a growing interest in PSA applications. This has lead to an increased interest and need to 
make judgments concerning the acceptability of risk contributions calculated with PSA. 
The paper describes work performed within an on-going Nordic project dealing with the use of probabilistic 
safety criteria for nuclear power plants [3 and 4]. The project is performed during the period 2005-2009. It 
was initiated by NKS (Nordic Nuclear Safety Research) and NPSAG (Nordic PSA Group), and has relations 
to an on-going OECD/NEA WGRisk task on probabilistic safety criteria in member countries. 
 
Consistency in the usage of safety goals 
Consistency in judgement over time has been perceived to be one of the main problems in the usage of safety 
goals. Safety goals defined in the 80s were met in the beginning with PSA:s performed to the standards of that 
time, i.e., by PSA:s that were quite limited in scope and level of detail compared to today’s state of the art.  
This issue has been investigated by performing a comparative review of three generations of the same PSA, 
focusing on the impact from changes over time in component failure data, initiating event (IE) frequency, and 
of the PSA modelling of the plant, including plant changes and changes in success criteria. It proved to be 
very time-consuming and in some cases next to impossible to correctly identify the basic causes for changes in 
PSA results. A multitude of different sub-causes combined and were difficult to differentiate. Thus, rigorous 
book-keeping is needed in order to keep track of how and why PSA results change. This is especially 
important in order to differentiate “real” differences due to plant changes and updated component and IE data 
from differences that are due to general PSA development (scope, level of detail, modelling issues). 
Criteria for assessment of results from PSA level 2 
Goals related to CDF and LERF are surrogates to societal risk level criteria. To fully validate these goals, 
calculations of environmental consequences of release sequences would need to be made. The on-going 
international survey conducted by the OECD/NEA WG Risk shows that acceptance criteria for results from 
level 2 PSA differ considerably between countries. Both definitions for large release and probability values 
differ. Further, the status of criteria differs from mandatory requirements to informal targets. Some countries 
do not use probabilistic criteria at all.  
The probability limits used in level 2 PSA vary from 10-7/year to 10-5/year. The highest criteria (10-5/year) 
have been defined for old reactors only. For new reactors, targets between 10-7/year and 10-6/year have been 
defined. See Figure 1 for an illustration.  
These numbers can be compared to risks experienced or accepted otherwise in society. Thus, from the 
individual risk point of view, these numbers are acceptable. However, to validate the acceptability of these 
target values from a societal risk point of view, level 3 PSA assessments need to be made. Results from such 
assessments are strongly dependent on population data, weather data, and whether or not countermeasures are 
accounted.  
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Figure 1. Overview of probabilistic criteria related to level 2 PSA 
 
The aim of the definition for large release of the severe reactor accident is such that, first of all, the release 
magnitude shall be reduced to such an amount that no acute health effects are caused in the environment. It 
follows from this requirement that only stochastic late effects can be expected. The criterion “100 TBq Cs-
137” used in Finland and the differently worded but almost identical criterion “0,1 % of the core inventory of 
Cs-137 in an 1800 MWt BWR” used in Sweden, are examples of criteria fulfilling the above requirement. Test 
calculations with environmental data from a Finnish nuclear power plant site shows that this particular release 
limit would not cause acute heath effects and that late health effects would be minor. 
 
Overview of international safety goals  
The on-going OECD/NEA Working group RISK task group on probabilistic safety criteria has the objectives 
to review the rationales for definition, the current status, and actual experiences regarding the use of 
probabilistic safety goals and other PSA related numerical risk criteria in the member states. The NKS project 
participates actively in the task. At present, responses have been received to a questionnaire and been 
compiled into a draft final report, which is expected to be finalised in the first half of 2009. 
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Safety goals related to other man-made risks in society 
In order to provide perspective on the project’s detailed treatment of probabilistic safety goals for nuclear 
power plants, some information from other areas has been collected, with the focus on the use of probabilistic 
risk criteria in European offshore oli and gas operations and in the European railway industry. 
In offshore oil and gas operations both the number of precursor events requiring handling and of accidents 
requiring mitigation is high compared to the nuclear industry, resulting in a relatively high focus in the criteria 
on consequence mitigation. Criteria have a large scope, i.e. they apply to a wide range of accident events and 
consider a wide range of safety functions. Defence in depth aspects are considered in the criteria by stating 
requirements for different safety functions. Finally, the ALARP principle is often applied, involving a safety 
goal with a limit and an objective. 
For European rail systems, a standardisation of safety goals has been prompted by the expressed aim of 
making it possible for trains and personnel to cross national borders. The harmonisation has been achieved by 
letting an industry working group propose safety goals, which have then been accepted by authorities. The 
goals suggested are consensus requirements based on an amalgamation of national practices, mainly from 
Germany and France. Basic principles are based on comparison to general health risk (MEM principle) and a 
requirement for continuous improvement of safety (GAMAB). Systematic procedures are in place for creating 
subsidiary goals, which is done by defining a tolerable hazard rate (THR) for each subsystem forming part of 
the overall system. Finally, it is worth noting, that a framework for cross-acceptance is under development, 
i.e., development of an agreed common approach for demonstrating the safety levels of the railway system (in 
addition to the common risk criteria already in place). 
 
Ongoing work 
The first phase of the project (2006) described the status, concepts and history of probabilistic safety goals for 
nuclear power plants. The second and third phases (2007-08) have provided guidance related to the resolution 
of some of the problems identified, and resulted in a common understanding regarding the definition of safety 
goals. During phase 4 (2009), the international overview (OECD/NEA WGRisk task on safety criteria) will be 
finalised, and results and conclusions from this project will be considered. In addition, focus will specifically 
be put on questions related to application and communication. Guidance to the definition of valid subsidiary 
criteria will be developed, i.e., lower level criteria that are indirectly related to the societal and individual risk 
criteria but that are directly applicable with present PSAs. Finally, some additional aspects related to the issue 
of consistency over time in the usage of safety goals will be explored. 
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Background 
Studies on risk-informed methods have been a part of NKS activities since late 1980´s, but at that time the 
industry was not ready for the use of these methods. The common understanding right now is that the industry 
and authorities are ready for adoption of risk-informed strategies. It shall be noted that Finland has developed 
the use of risk-informed analyses, whereas this area has been less focused in Sweden. 
The use of risk informed methods in daily operation at the Nuclear Power Plants as well as for long term 
evaluation and definition of rules and regulations is increasing. Risk informed methods have been applied on a 
case by case basis during the past few years, but it is expected that these methods will be applied in a quite 
different manner in the coming years. 
 
Evaluation of TS from a risk point of view raises several questions: 
• How shall the TS conditions be evaluated? 
• What aspects shall be taken into consideration? 
• Can a prolonged/shortened test interval or AOT (allowed outage time) affect the experienced importance of 
the equipment? 
 
What is PSA? 
PSA stands for Probalistic safety assessment and is a systematic approach studying all failures (including the 
probability of failure) and effects of these failures. A Boolean logic is built of the plant in event trees (see 
figure 1), representing the different sequences that failure and success of different systems can cause, and fault 
trees (see figure 2) representing the failures of the components etc of a system. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of an Event Tree 
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Figure 2. Example of a Fault Tree 
 
This is a tedious task which will give a ”complete representation” of plant core damage or release to 
environment frequency. The model is normally very complex and it provides a tool to be able to analyze the 
importance of each SSC from a plant perspective. 
 
Technical Specification, TS 
The TS sets the rules for a safe operation of a nuclear power plant. The TS is mainly representing the Safety 
Analysis Report (SAR) requirements (that define the initial conditions for the safety analysis). Example:  
• Define how many components/trains that, at least, shall be available  
• Define exemptions, AOT: How long time can continued operation with components out of service 
(acceptable risk) 
• Define test interval for emergency core cooling system (acceptable probability of failure) 
• Administrative requirements  
A constraint that shall be noticed is that: Shutdown is also a challenge to the plant 
 
The Role of PSA 
Previously the role of PSA is mainly a “verification” tool, that is used in addition to the other tools. You could 
say that the process is that the deterministic requirements sets the requirements on the plant, and then PSA is 
used to verify that it is safe enough. Figure 3 exemplifies this. 
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Figure 3. PSA as a verification tool. 
 
This project is studying a more intensive use of the PSA, also in the definition of the deterministic 
requirements, in this case the TS. This means that the requirements on how and what the PSA really means 
and its applicability is of much greater importance. Figure 4 shows what the intention of this project is. 
 
 
Figure 4. PSA being part of the setting of the requirements in the TS. 
 
Why shall PSA be used in the Evaluation of the TS? 
In the evaluation process of TS changes there are many aspects that must taken into account. It is obvious that 
the PSA cannot represent all relevant aspects that should be considered – and that should never be the 
intention. If PSA cannot represent all relevant aspects, does it add any information to use the PSA? 
There are very few ways of analyzing the impact of plant changes to the overall risk.  Therefore, the PSA add 
valuable information.  
It can be noticed that both STUK and SKI require changes in the TS to be verified with PSA (SKI does not 
formally require this but the practice has been this). Also, the US NRC has fully adopted a risk informed 
decision process, in which PSA (PRA) plays an important role. 
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The End Product, the Guidance Document 
What has been noticed is that there has not been an agreement on which initiating events, plant states, risk 
measures etc. that shall be used in an evaluation. This project aims at producing guidance with regard to 
following: 
Contents of TS (what and how of the TS can and shall be analyzed with PSA) 
• What equipment shall be analyzed with PSA?  
• Shall the PSA affect the contents of the TS (can equipment be excluded from TS if they have no or low 
importance in PSA)? 
What is the evaluation criteria  
• Core damage frequency? 
• Release frequency? 
• Others? 
Type of initiating events to include in the analysis  
• Only internal events? 
• Comprise all types of initiators? 
• Else? 
Quality issues on the PSA model  
• How shall requirements be set on the PSA for it to be appropriate? 
Acceptance criteria  
 
The project is ongoing and is scheduled to be finalized during 2009. 
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Introduction 
The NKS-B URBHAND activity was finalised in 2008 with the issuing of NKS report 175 (Andersson et al., 
2008) - a handbook aimed at addressing the specific needs of Nordic decision makers and their advisors in 
relation to optimised recovery of inhabited areas contaminated with radioactive pollutants.  The focus is on the 
mitigation of long-term problems.  The information given in the handbook is comprehensive, and many details 
require careful consideration well before implementation of countermeasures in a specific area. Training 
sessions are therefore recommended. The handbook describes the current relevant Nordic preparedness 
(dissemination routes) in detail, and suggests methods for measurement of contamination and prognoses of 
resultant doses, and data for evaluation of countermeasures and associated waste management options. A 
number of non-technical aspects of contamination in inhabited areas, and of countermeasures for its 
mitigation, are discussed, and a series of recommendations on the application of all the handbook data in a 
holistic countermeasure strategy are given. 
 
Methods and background 
The URBHAND activity builds on experience obtained through practical and theoretical investigations of the 
consequences of radioactive contamination in inhabited areas - a field of work that practically arose with the 
Chernobyl accident, as it was previously erroneously believed that plausible emergencies could only lead to 
significant contamination in rural areas with low population density.  A series of experimental programmes 
have been conducted over the years that followed the Chernobyl accident (see, e.g., Fogh et al., 1999; 
Andersson & Roed, 2006).  At the same time efforts were made to improve the understanding of urban 
radioecology in general, and processes governing the doses that would be received in inhabited areas with 
different characteristics were scrutinised (Andersson et al., 2002).  The Chernobyl accident further provided a 
unique opportunity to examine the various responses of affected persons and impacts on society of a major 
emergency situation (Howard et al., 2005). Knowledge of this type is essential in emergency decision-making, 
to address requirements for information and dialogue and evaluate the situation in a holistic perspective, so 
that optimised solutions can be implemented. 
 
Results and discussion 
The URBHAND handbook comprises the following elements: 
• Introduction (scope, context, audience, structure, intended application) 
• Methodologies, systems and equipment for measurement (planning of measurements, methods, priorities, 
procedures, training) 
• Countermeasures and implementation strategies (descriptions in standardised format of individual 
countermeasures, advise on formation of strategies) 
• Estimation of doses in a contaminated inhabited area (look-up tables for different dose contributions under 
different conditions) 
• Doses and countermeasures specifically for kitchen gardens (practise in the different Nordic countries, 
dose examples, countermeasure techniques)  
• Management of waste generated by countermeasures (wastes from different types of surfaces, repository 
design recommendations) 
• Legal, social, ethical and communication implications (social problems, communication and risk 
perception, ethical principles) 
• Application examples (NPP accident scenario, ‘RDD dispersion’)  
• Description of the current organisational structure of Nordic emergency management. 
It was developed in parallel with the generic European EURANOS handbook for inhabited areas (Brown et 
al., 2009).  The EURANOS handbook is in a sense comparatively much more comprehensive, as it is aimed at 
providing decision support in relation to all time-phases of contaminating incidents that might occur in all 
regions of Europe, where for instance traditional practice varies considerably, and environmental conditions 
can put different constraints on countermeasure application.  Acknowledging that considerable location-
specific parameterisation and contextualisation is required to integrate the EURANOS handbook in any 
operational national emergency management system, the authors of the EURANOS handbook strongly 
recommend that its contents be ‘customised’ and as such only form the background material for more focused 
handbooks for use in specific countries or regions.   
The URBHAND handbook is aimed at presenting information that is directly applicable in the event of an 
accident contaminating a Nordic inhabited area.  This is for instance reflected in a focused, limited selection of 
countermeasures and a section describing the structure of the emergency management organisation in the 
Nordic community.  This focusing makes the URBHAND handbook much easier to overview and handle in 
relation to a crisis situation.   Moreover, it is important to be aware that in spite of its highly generic approach, 
the EURANOS handbook has some inherent shortcomings and restrictions.  One of these is that due to the 
initial definitions of the EURANOS project, none of the dose calculations are suited for handling smaller scale 
contamination events like ‘dirty bombs’, although it is clear from calculations made elsewhere that 
consequences of ‘dirty bombs’ can be very severe and extend out over large inhabited areas (Andersson et al., 
2008a).  The URBHAND report offers some initial considerations to address this problem. 
Compared with the EURANOS handbook, the URBHAND handbook provides more refined dose calculations 
for different inhabited environments, enabling direct evaluation of averted doses by introducing a 
countermeasure on a given environmental surface.  As agricultural products would primarily be produced 
outside the inhabited areas, the primary focus is on the long term external doses.  However, it is recognised 
that some food products may be produced in residential areas, e.g., in kitchen gardens, and the inclusion in 
URBHAND of the impact of a contaminating incident on kitchen garden products in decision-support 
handbook material is pioneer work.  Figure 1 shows an overview of the different contamination pathways to 
be considered in an inhabited complex, giving rise to many different types of dose contributions. 
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Figure 1. Potentially significant pathways of radionuclides in a residential area. 
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An important part of the handbook development has been a dialogue with end-user representatives in each of 
the Nordic countries, to focus the work on the specific needs of the user community.  One of the instruments 
applied in this context was an exercise in the use of a prototype of the handbook, which gave valuable 
comments and directions that were followed up in the preparation of the final version.  
In-line with the latest ICRP recommendations, a host of non-radiological factors are described in the 
URBHAND handbook.  For instance, questions to consider in relation to social, ethical and communication 
factors in time before implementing any countermeasure strategy include: 
• Has it been considered which direct costs the countermeasure implementation will have on society? 
• Which indirect, economical, social, psychological and ethical problems could arise from countermeasure 
implementation, and which problems would be solved? 
• How could the problems be addressed, with respect to re-establishment of societal functions and 
minimisation of penalties?  
• Have adequate steps been made towards establishment of strategies for communication in an emergency, 
e.g., with the public and media? 
• Have local assessments of risk perception been adequately considered in development of communication 
strategies? 
• Do implementation plans contain sufficient level of stakeholder dialogue to avoid social disruption / 
problems? 
• Is there risk that ethical key issues could be violated? 
• Is the decision-making platform sufficiently matured to eliminate the risk of implements that could be seen 
as contradictory? 
• Has it been ensured that affected persons are adequately informed of any additional risks that might arise 
and given a reasonable choice? 
• Is the level of information given to operators sufficient to ensure optimal countermeasure implementation? 
• Have practical methodological requirements been identified in local context, and has this knowledge been 
communicated out so that availability (also of technical support, e.g., for measurements) is secured prior to 
an emergency? 
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Introduction 
This report summarises the findings of a project on assessing the impact of releases of radionuclides into 
sewage systems in urban environment - simulation, modelling and experimental studies- LUCIA. The project 
was partially financed by the Nordic nuclear safety research (NKS) in 2006 and 2007 and was established to 
provide more knowledge and suitable tools for emergency preparedness purposes in urban areas. 
Wastewater that arises from dwellings, industries, universities and hospitals is transported through the sewer 
system to sewage treatment plants. These plants use biological and chemical precipitation methods to remove 
solid materials, as well as dissolved organic matter from the wastewater. Following treatment, effluents may 
be discharged to rivers or lakes in inland or to coastal waters. The remaining fraction, the sludge, is further 
dewatered at the plant and is mainly used as landfills at various sites since the heavy metal content has 
prevented its use as fertiliser for agricultural purposes. 
The design of sewage treatment plants, and their wastewater treatments, is rather similar between the Nordic 
countries. The differences are mainly in their size, commonly measured by the number of person-equivalent 
served. The most exposed individuals for the releases of clinical radioactive waste from hospitals are usually 
to be found either at the sewage plant or in connection to the water recipients. 
In this study one sewage plant in each of the five Nordic countries was selected for assessing the impact of 
radionuclide releases from hospitals into their sewerage systems. Measurements and model predictions of dose 
assessments to different potentially exposed members of the public were carried out. The models and 
approaches developed can also be applied in case of accidental releases.  
 
Experimental Studies 
One sewage plant per Nordic country has been chosen for this study. Information on all sewage treatment 
plants were acquired with the help of a questionnaire. Further information on hospital releases to those sewage 
treatment plants was also collated. 
Measurements have been undertaken at those sewage works to determine the concentrations in sludge and 
water of clinically administered radionuclides. All measurements followed the same sampling protocol based 
on previous experiences in the field. Radionuclides measured included, but not the same set in all countries: 
131I, 111In, 99mTc, 177Lu, 214Pb, 214Bi, 201Tl, 7Be, 40K, 137Cs, 153Sm. 
Generic hospital data were also obtained, including radiopharmaceuticals administered to patients, activities 
and discharge rates that will enter the given wastewater sewage treatment plants. In some cases hospital data 
were also directly linked to the sampling programme in the sewage treatment plants. 
All results from the sampling activities are presented in the report, per country, together with the influence of 
hospital inputs on the activity of incoming and outgoing water in the treatment plants. The removal of nuclides 
from the wastewater during the treatment process can then be estimated by comparing the radionuclides used 
in hospitals to those detected in the wastewater treatment plants. 
A laboratory inter-comparison exercise was organised to compare analytical results across the laboratories 
participating in the project, using both 131I, dominating man-made radionuclide in sewage systems due to the 
medical use for diagnostic and therapeutic applications, and 111In used for medical diagnostic purposes and 
also commonly found in sewage systems. Overall, good agreement was found between participants for both 
sludge and water samples, but the agreement between laboratories for 131I was slightly better than for 111In.  
Acquired data were used for verification of the simulations performed by the LUCIA model. 
 
Application of Models 
The modelling prediction tool for assessing the impact of liquid releases of radionuclides into the sewage 
systems is described. The prediction tool is based on the model LUCIA that has been modified for more 
generic applications. 
The LUCIA model is a dynamic model. A dynamic approach is needs as equilibrium radionuclide 
concentrations may not exist within a sewage plant; due to the fact that radionuclides are not released 
continuously from hospitals during the whole year at a constant rate, but rather as pulses lasting few days. 
The LUCIA model was initially developed for the sewage plant Kungsängsverket in Uppsala, but could be 
directly applied at Viikinmäki in Helsinki and Aalborg Renseanlæg Vest in Aalborg with their plant-specific 
parameter values. A simplified version of the LUCIA model was applied at Skólpa Klettagardar in Reykjavik, 
with no biological treatment being used. A modification of the model was necessary for Vestfjorden 
avløpsselskap in Oslo, as it uses a different type of biological treatment.  
The LUCIA mathematical model consists of a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE). These 
represent the mass balance in the different compartments. These allow estimating the concentration of 
radionuclides in water and sludge depending on the radionuclide concentration in the plant inlet. The model 
was implemented using the software package Ecolego (from Facilia AB). 
Parameters relating to the treatment processes are derived from data measured in the studied sewage plants. 
Although an extensive literature review was carried out, distribution coefficients for sludge were not found for 
any of the elements of interest. Instead, Kd values reported for organic soils were used, which to some extend 
can be considered as representative for sewage sludge, consisting mainly of organic material. 
The sensitivity of the model to variation in the model parameters was studied using the software package 
Eikos (From Facilia AB). The sensitivity study was carried out for 131I, which is one of the significant 
radionuclides for the exposure of sewage workers. The LUCIA conceptual model is shown schematically 
below and the series of assumptions are described in the final report. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual representation of the LUCIA model for the Uppsala sewage plant. Each box represents a model 
compartment that is associated with a plant component and the arrows to radionuclide fluxes between compartments. R1: 
Primary sedimentation basins - water phase; R1sed: Primary sedimentation basins - precipitated sludge; R2: Basins for 
biological treatment; R3: Secondary sedimentation basins - water phase; R3sed: Secondary sedimentation basins - 
precipitated sludge; R4: Sedimentation basin for final polishing - water phase; T1: Thickener, sink and silo; T2: Digester; 
T3: Centrifuge and sludge storage. 
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A process oriented model of the biological treatment is also proposed in the report that does not require as 
much input data as for the LUCIA model. This model is a combination of a simplified well known Activated 
Sludge Model No.1 (Henze, 1987) and the Kd concept used in the LUCIA model. The simplified model is 
able to estimate the concentrations and the retention time of the sludge in different parts of the treatment plant, 
which in turn, can be used as a tool for the dose assessment purpose.  
 
Dose assessments 
Doses resulting from routine releases of 99mTc and 131I from hospitals into each of the study sewage plants 
were calculated. The doses were calculated for hypothetical individuals representing potentially three exposed 
members of the public, including: i) sewage workers, ii) individuals potentially exposed to the water released 
from the sewage plants and iii) individuals potentially exposed to contaminated sewage sludge that is used for 
fertilization of agricultural lands. The annual release rates of radionuclides were used as inputs to the LUCIA 
model, for calculating radionuclide concentrations in water and sludge. The calculations of radionuclide 
concentrations and doses were performed using the software-package Ecolego. All models, and chosen 
parameters, are described in the report, highlighting pathways that each potentially exposed members of the 
public may be exposed. The resulting radionuclide concentration values in discharge water and sewage sludge 
are reported for each studied sewage treatment plant. The predicted differences between the plants are within 
one order of magnitude and reflect the differences in the release rates applied. 
For hypothetical individuals who may drink water and ingest fish contaminated by sewage water, predicted 
values of annual dose rates are conservative as estimates do not take into account the dilution of the waters 
discharged from the plant in the final recipient. Estimated doses, for all studied plants, are well below 10 
µSv/a for 99mTc, which is a commonly accepted exemption level (EU). For 131I doses above the exemption 
levels are obtained, if dilution in the final recipient is not taken into account. 
For hypothetical sewage workers, predicted values of annual dose rates are conservative, as it is assumed that 
exposure occurs during the whole working day, i.e. 8 hours every working day. The best estimates of the 
doses were insignificant, below 10 µSv/a, for both 99mTc and 131I in all studied plants. If uncertainties in the 
prediction of activity concentrations in sludge are considered, then the probability of obtaining doses above 10 
µSv/a may not be insignificant. It can therefore be concluded that doses to sewage workers require a more 
realistic and case by case consideration.   
For hypothetical farmers that use sewage sludge for fertilization of agricultural lands, predicted values of 
annul dose rates for both studied radionuclides and all sewage plants, were well below the commonly accepted 
exemption level of 10 µSv/a.  The doses were also much lower than the doses to the sewage workers and 
doses to individuals by water pathways. 
 
Conclusion  
The studied sewage treatment plants and associated treatment processes are quite similar in the five Nordic 
countries. In addition handling of liquid radioactive waste from hospitals carrying out nuclear medical 
treatment is comparable between the five countries. Information on all plants was collated and measurements 
carried out in those sewage treatment plants as well as in hospital discharges that will input into the plants. 
Data acquired was used as input to the models used to calculate doses to hypothetical members of the public. 
Doses from radionuclides that are routinely released from hospitals into sewage systems have been estimated 
for selected plants in all Nordic countries, using the LUCIA model implemented in Ecolego. 
The results indicate that in case of routine releases annual doses to the three hypothetical groups of individuals 
are most likely insignificant. Estimated doses for workers are below 10 µSv/y, for the two studied 
radionuclides 99mTc and 131I. If uncertainties in the predictions of activity concentrations in sludge are 
considered, then the probability of obtaining doses above 10 µSv/y may not be insignificant. Also, doses 
associated with usage of sewage sludge, such as farmer using sludge for fertilization, are lower that doses to 
individuals affected by water pathways. The models and approaches developed in this project can be applied 
for accidental releases. In case of accidental releases to sewage plants, it is important to take into account the 
dynamics in the variation of the activity concentrations in the sewage water and sludge. This would allow 
more properly estimation of the time variation of the doses and identification of the people that can be 
affected. 
 
The final NKS report for the NKS-B LUCIA activity is available here. 
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